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Executive Summary 
 
 
The American Dream Demonstration (ADD) is the first systematic study of Individual 
Development Account (IDA) programs.  IDAs are special accounts wherein savings are matched 
for the poor.   
 
While saving is not easy for anyone, it is more difficult for the poor because they have few 
resources and because they lack access to some public policy mechanisms, such as tax-benefited 
retirement accounts, that subsidize saving. 
 
IDAs are designed to increase savings incentives for the poor.  Savings in IDAs are matched if 
used for home ownership, post-secondary education, microenterprise, or other approved asset 
uses.  Participants also receive financial education and support from IDA staff. 
 
Do IDAs work?  ADD suggests that the poor can save and accumulate assets in IDAs: 
 
• Average monthly net deposits per participant were $19.07. 
 
• The average participant saved about $1 for every $2 that could have been matched. 
 
• The average participant made a deposit in about 6 of every 12 months. 
 
• With an average match rate of about 2:1, participants accumulated approximately $700 per 
year in IDAs. 
 
 
The American Dream Demonstration 
 
ADD is a demonstration of IDAs in 14 programs across the United States.  It ran for four years 
(1997-2001) and the research takes place over the course of seven years (1997-2003).   
 
The Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED) in Washington, D.C., designed and guided 
ADD.  The Center for Social Development (CSD) at Washington University in St. Louis 
designed the research.   
 
Data 
 
This research report contains quantitative data on ADD programs and participants collected from 
the Management Information System for Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA), a 
system designed and supported by CSD.   
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Participation in ADD 
 
Enrollment.  A participant is defined as someone who enrolled in the program and who had an 
account statement in MIS IDA.  Enrollment in ADD began July 1, 1997, and ended by December 
31, 1999.  For most participants, savings ended and matches were possible only for deposits 
through December 31, 2001.  At that date, ADD had 2,364 participants.   
 
Savers.  Fifty-six percent of enrollees in ADD were savers, defined as participants who saved a 
net of $100 or more as of December 31, 2001.  Low-savers (44 percent) may have saved up to a 
net of $100 and maintained assets for a time, but they also dissaved and/or became ineligible for 
matches.  In this report, the level of net matchable deposits determines the distinction between a 
saver and a low-saver.  This definition is less arbitrary than that of exits, those marked in MIS 
IDA by program staff as having left ADD due to either drop-out or kick-out (Schreiner et al., 
2001).   
 
Savings Outcomes in ADD 
 
Following are the savings outcomes for all participants in ADD as of December 31, 2001: 
 
Gross deposits.  Average participation was 24.5 months, and average gross deposits per month 
were $40.  Excluding months without deposits, average gross deposits per month were $83.   
 
Unmatched withdrawals.  About 64 percent of participants made unmatched withdrawals from 
matchable balances.  For these participants, the average number was 3.6, and the average amount 
removed was $451.   
 
Net deposits.  Net deposits are defined as matchable deposits plus interest (net of fees) minus 
unmatched withdrawals.  Average net deposits for all participants were $528.  
 
If all net deposits as of December 31, 2001 were used in matched withdrawals, then the average 
participant would accumulate a total of $1,543.  With only savers included, total accumulation 
per participant is $2,755. 
 
Average monthly net deposit.  The average monthly net deposit (AMND)—defined as net 
deposits divided by months of participation—was $19.07 ($33.81 for savers).  Median AMND 
was $9.83.  With an average match rate of about 2:1, the average participant in ADD 
accumulated about $700 per year.   
 
Matched withdrawals.  Approximately 32 percent of ADD participants had made a matched 
withdrawal as of December 31, 2001.  The average value of matched withdrawals per participant 
with at least one matched withdrawal was $878, and the average value of matched withdrawals 
plus matches per participant was $2,586.   
 
Matched Uses.  The largest portion (28 percent) of matched withdrawals were used for home 
purchase, followed by microenterprise (23 percent), post-secondary education (21 percent), and 
home repair (18 percent).  As of December 31, 2001, 43 percent of savers had not yet taken a 
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matched withdrawal.  Of this group, 55 percent intend to make a matched withdrawal for home 
purchase, 18 percent for microenterprise, and 14 percent for post-secondary education.  Although 
matched deposits ended as of December 31, 2001, matched withdrawals can still be made 
through June 30, 2002. 
 
Deposit frequency.  On average, participants made a deposit in approximately 6 months during 
a year.  Some evidence (Schreiner et al., 2001) suggests that frequent depositors accumulate 
more savings than infrequent depositors, although the direction of cause and effect is unclear. 
 
Net deposits as a percentage of the match cap.  The average participant saved 51 cents for 
every dollar that could have been matched.   
 
Savings rate.  On average, AMND was 1.6 percent of monthly income (median 0.7 percent).  
 
Regression Results 
 
Regression estimates the sign (positive or negative), size, and statistical significance of 
associations between the outcome (likelihood of being a saver or level of AMND) and 
characteristics assumed to influence the outcome.  The results summarized below are derived 
from multivariate regressions and control for a wide range of program and participant 
characteristics.  
 
Program Characteristics and Saving Performance 
 
Match rate.  In regression analysis, higher match rates increase the likelihood of being a saver.  
The match rate has no statistically significant effect on AMND.  The analysis technique used 
here, however, is known to have deficiencies in terms of its ability to reveal the true effects of 
match rates on savings performance (See Schreiner, 2001a). 
 
Match cap/monthly savings target.  An additional $10 of match cap per month increases the 
likelihood of being a saver by about 3 percentage points.  The opportunity to save more 
apparently increases the likelihood of being a saver.  These results, however, may confound the 
true effects of higher match caps with measurement issues created by the presence of the cap. 
 
Use of direct deposit.  Controlling for other factors, people who use direct deposit are 22 
percentage points more likely to be savers.  This is an enormous effect, with obvious policy 
implications.  Using direct deposit, however, has a negative (though statistically not significant) 
effect on AMND.  Direct deposit appears to help people to stay in the program, but not to help 
them save higher dollar amounts.   
 
General financial education.  A few hours of general financial education increase saving, 
although the effects of additional hours have diminishing returns.     
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Participant Characteristics1 and Saving Performance 
 
Participants in ADD are not a random sample of people eligible for IDAs.  They are both 
program-selected (they meet program-defined eligibility criteria) and self-selected (they 
voluntarily choose to join).  In other words, programs target certain groups, and people in the 
target group who expect the greatest net benefits are the most likely to enroll.  Results in this 
report pertain only to eligible participants who, if they had the choice, would enroll in IDAs. 
 
Gender.  Most participants in ADD (80 percent) were female.  Gender is not linked with the 
likelihood of being a saver nor with AMND. 
 
Age.  The average age at enrollment was 36, with a low of 13 and a high of 72.  Age is not a 
statistically significant factor in saving performance.  
 
Race/ethnicity.  Forty-seven percent of participants in ADD identified themselves as African-
American, 37 percent as Caucasian, 9 percent as Latino or Hispanic, 3 percent as Native 
American, 2 percent as Asian-American or Pacific-Islander, and 3 percent as “other”.  Asian 
Americans, Hispanics, and “other” ethnicities are most likely to be savers.   
 
Regarding AMND, Native Americans and African Americans saved the least, about $8 and $5 
less than Caucasians, respectively.  “Other” ethnicities, Asian Americans, and Hispanics all 
saved more than Caucasians, although the differences are not statistically significant.  In a 
change since our last report, Hispanics surpassed Asian Americans as the group whose 
unobserved characteristics are most correlated with high AMND.  The differences among 
Caucasians, “others”, Asian Americans, and Hispanics, however, are no larger than $3. 
 
Education.  Most participants in ADD (61 percent) attended some college, although 15 percent 
had less than a high school diploma.  People with more education, controlling for the other things 
in the regression, are more likely to be savers. 
 
Although education is linked with the likelihood of being a saver, it is not strongly linked with 
the amount saved.   
 
Employment status.  Almost 90 percent of participants worked or were students, and 78 percent 
had full-time or part-employment.  The main result is that students are much more likely to be 
savers than are members in any other employment group.  Likewise, being a student also has the 
strongest link with higher AMND. 
 
Receipt of public assistance.  Receipt of welfare (whether AFDC/TANF at or before 
enrollment, or food stamps or SSI at enrollment) is not strongly linked with the likelihood of 
being a saver nor with the level of savings. 
                                                           
1 The descriptions of the participant characteristics use the most recent data in MIS IDA; the 
regression results use characteristics recorded at enrollment. 
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Income.  Mean monthly household income of participants in ADD was $1,496, and household 
income was 116 percent of the family-size-adjusted poverty guideline.  Economic theory 
suggests that people with greater income will save more and also that people are more likely to 
save intermittent income than recurrent income.  Neither greater recurrent income nor greater 
intermittent income is significantly related to being a saver in ADD.  Recurrent income above 
$1,600 per month and intermittent income at all levels have small, positive and significant 
associations with AMND. 
 
Asset ownership.  Homeowners, car owners, and participants with checking accounts are more 
likely to be savers than those without such assets.  Homeowners also save about $5 more per 
month than renters. 
 
Liabilities.  Compared to people with no debt, people with some debt are less likely to be savers 
and also save less per month.   
 
Insurance coverage.  Compared to people without health insurance, people with health 
insurance are more likely to be savers.  This is a large and statistically significant effect.   
 
 
In a Nutshell 
 
Overall, about half of the people who participated in ADD were savers.  ADD program 
characteristics, both measured and unmeasured, are strongly linked with saving performance.  
Participant characteristics in general matter surprisingly little.  A noteworthy finding is that 
income is not related to being a saver, and has only small effects on the amount of savings.   
Center for Social Development 
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1.  Individual Development Accounts 
and the American Dream Demonstration 
 
 
This chapter provides an overview of IDAs and the American Dream Demonstration, 
summarizes the 13 host organizations and the groups targeted by their IDA programs, and 
describes the IDA program characteristics. 
 
 
Individual Development Accounts 
 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are subsidized savings accounts.  Unlike other 
subsidized savings accounts such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) or 401(k) plans, 
IDAs are targeted to the poor, provide subsidies through matches rather than through tax breaks, 
and require participants to attend financial education.  Participants accrue matches as they save 
for purposes that increase long-term well-being and financial self-sufficiency.  Examples of 
matched uses of withdrawals include home purchase, post-secondary education, and 
microenterprise.  Accounts can be opened at birth and can remain open for a lifetime.  Funds 
may come from public or private sources, and funding partnerships are common.  IDAs are a 
conceptually simple community-development and public-policy tool that may be adapted to a 
wide range of applications and circumstances. 
 
 
American Dream Demonstration  
 
The American Dream Demonstration (ADD) is the first systematic study of IDAs.  Its purpose is 
to find out whether IDAs are successful, in what ways, and for whom.  Because IDAs are still 
fairly new and because there is much to learn, research is central in ADD.   
 
The ADD research is multi-faceted (Appendix A); indeed, it may be one of the most thorough 
and comprehensive evaluations of a social or economic policy demonstration.  CSD designed the 
research with the advice of an expert Evaluation Advisory Committee (Appendix B).  The 
research uses multiple methods (Sherraden, et al., 1995), each with a different purpose, and the 
study takes place over the course of seven years (1997-2003).  The multiple methods are 
designed to examine ADD from as many perspectives as possible and to gather timely data in 
order to inform the development of IDA policy and of programs outside of ADD.  This research 
(monitoring savings performance) tracks program-level data and collects individual-level data on 
savings and personal characteristics for all participants. 
 
This report contains data collected from the inception of ADD through December 31, 2001, and 
is the last in a series of monitoring reports (Sherraden et al., 1999; Sherraden et al., 2000; 
Schreiner et al., 2001).     
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Host Organizations 
 
This first large-scale test of IDAs was started by the Corporation for Enterprise Development 
(CFED) in 1997.  ADD involves 13 host organizations1 selected through a competitive process to 
design, implement, and run IDA programs.  Table 1.1 contains a brief description of each host 
organization and of the groups targeted by their IDA programs.   
 
 
Table 1.1  The 13 Host Organizations in ADD 
Host Organization Location Type of Organization Targeted Participants          
for IDAs 
ADVOCAP Fond du Lac, WI Community action agency Former AFDC/TANF 
recipients; the working poor  
Alternatives Federal Credit 
Union 
Ithaca, NY Community development 
credit union 
Single parents; youth 
Bay Area IDA Collaborative 
(formerly EBALDC) 
Oakland, CA Collaborative of 13 
community-based 
organizations 
Low-income Asian Americans; 
African Americans; Hispanics 
Capital Area Asset Building 
Corporation (CAAB) 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Collaborative of 8 
community-based 
organizations  
TANF recipients; youth; 
African Americans; Hispanics; 
Asian Americans   
Foundation Communities 
(formerly Central Texas 
 Mutual Housing) 
Austin, TX Not-for-profit housing 
organization 
Rental property residents; youth 
Central Vermont Community 
Action Council (CVCAC) 
Barre, VT Community action agency 
and community 
development corporation 
TANF recipients; youth 
Community Action Project of 
Tulsa County (CAPTC) 
Tulsa, OK Community-based anti-
poverty organization 
Small-scale: Working families 
with children at or below 200% 
of poverty. 
Large-scale: at or below 150% 
of poverty. 
Heart of America Family 
Services  
Kansas City, MO Community-based family-
services agency 
Hispanics; African Americans 
Mercy Corps 
(formerly Human Solutions) 
Portland, OR Social-service organization Rental property residents 
MACED/Owsley County 
Action Team 
Berea, KY Association of community 
development organizations 
Rental property residents; the 
working poor 
Near Eastside IDA Program Indianapolis, IN Social-service organization 
/ Community development 
credit union 
Neighborhood residents; youth 
Shorebank Corporation Chicago, IL Community development 
bank with not-for-profit 
affiliate 
Rental property residents; 
Shorebank customers 
Women’s Self-Employment 
Project (WSEP) 
Chicago, IL Microenterprise 
development organization 
Low-income, self-employed 
women; public-housing 
residents 
                                                           
1 One host organization, CAPTC, has two IDA programs, so this report refers to 14 “IDA 
programs” and 13 “host organizations.”  A given program may have more than one “site,” where 
different sites represent different IDA program designs. 
IDAs and ADD   3 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
ADD began with funds from 11 private foundations channeled through CFED.  After inception, 
some host organizations have been awarded additional contracts through the Assets for 
Independence Act (AFIA) from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  As a result, 
funds for some participants in ADD come from both ADD and AFIA.  Because AFIA funds 
came with design requirements that differed from those that were already in place for ADD,2 
records for IDA participants within each program are grouped into sites, with one site for 
participants enrolled in the original site and another site for participants enrolled in the site with 
the new designs required by AFIA.  This report looks at data from both the original sites and the 
new sites. 
 
Enrollments 
 
Enrollment in ADD began July 1, 1997 and ended by December 31, 1999, although some 
participants enrolled after the deadline.  As of December 31, 2001, ADD had 2,364 participants.  
This figure is lower than the 2,378 participants reported in Schreiner et al. (2001), as some 
people reported earlier as participants have been discovered to have been ineligible from the start 
or left ADD for reasons beyond their control (such as moving to a place distant from the program 
or dying).  For most participants, savings ended and matches were allowed only for deposits 
made through December 31, 2001.  Matched withdrawals are possible at most ADD programs 
through June 30, 2002. 
 
 
ADD Program Characteristics 
 
Account Structure 
 
Match rate.  The match rate is the number of dollars disbursed by the IDA program to a vendor 
for each dollar withdrawn in a matched withdrawal.  The match rate may vary among 
participants in a given program, so the average match rate is taken not across programs but 
across participants.  The mean (and median) is about 2:1, with a low of 1:1 (27 percent of 
participants).  Six percent of participants in ADD have a match rate between 4:1 and 7:1.  
 
Time cap.  Time cap is defined as the number of months after opening an account in which a 
participant may make matchable deposits.  Although deposits after the time cap are not 
matchable, participants may still make matched withdrawals after the time cap.  In ADD, the 
mean time cap was 32 months, with a low of 17 and a high of 50. 
 
Match cap.  The match cap is the limit on the amount of matchable deposits possible before the 
time cap.  Participants can make deposits beyond the match cap, but these excess deposits are not 
matchable.  The mean total match cap in ADD was $1,466, with a low of $240 and a high of 
$7,500.  ADD has two types of match-cap structures, annual and lifetime. 
                                                           
2 In general, the AFIA program design is more restrictive than the original ADD program 
designs.  Examples include stricter income guidelines, the existence of an asset test, and fewer 
qualified matchable uses.  Appendix C of Schreiner et al., 2001 details the program design for 
each host organization in ADD. 
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In an annual match-cap structure, participants face a match cap in each participation-year.  The 
total match cap is the sum of the annual match caps.  For example, suppose an account has a 2-
year time cap and a $500 annual match cap.  In the first twelve months, deposits up to $500 are 
matchable, and in the second twelve months, another $500 of deposits are matchable.  Unused 
match eligibility is lost as each year passes.  For example, if someone with a 2-year time cap and 
a $500 annual match cap deposits $200 in the first year and $900 in the second year, $200 is 
matchable in the first year, and $500 is matchable in the second year.  The $300 of unused match 
eligibility in the first year is lost.  Balances in excess of an annual match cap, however, are 
matchable in following years.  For example, if someone with a 2-year time cap and a $500 
annual match cap deposited $900 in the first year and $200 in the second year, then the $400 that 
was not matchable in the first year becomes matchable in the first month of the second year.  
Only $100 of the $200 deposited in the second year is then matchable.  In ADD, 52 percent of 
participants had an annual match-cap structure. 
 
In a lifetime match-cap structure, all deposits before the time cap are matchable, up to the 
lifetime match cap.  The total match cap equals the lifetime match cap.  For example, if someone 
with a 2-year time cap and a $1,000 lifetime match cap deposits $200 in the first year and $900 
in the second year, then $1,000 are matchable.  In ADD, 48 percent of participants had a lifetime 
match-cap structure.3 
 
Monthly savings target.  The monthly savings target is the total match cap divided by the time 
cap.  It is the amount which, if saved each month and not removed in unmatched withdrawals, 
would produce net deposits equal to the total match cap in the last month before the time cap.  
ADD programs want participants to save the monthly savings target, and some explicitly ask 
them to do so.  In ADD, the mean monthly savings target is $42, with a low of $9 and a high of 
$208. 
 
Matchable Uses 
 
ADD program participants may save for expenditures related to homeownership (including home 
purchase and repair), starting or supporting a microenterprise, post-secondary education or job 
training, or retirement.  Federal AFIA funds may not be used for home repair nor for retirement. 
 
Financial Education 
 
Besides matches, a central feature of IDAs is required financial education.  Financial education 
in ADD took two forms, general and asset-specific.  General financial education includes topics 
such as how to make a budget and how to manage money.  The classes teach psychological and 
behavioral strategies meant to help participants to make deposits and to maintain balances.  The 
general financial education includes topics such as credit and debt management, credit repair, 
                                                           
3 Like current subsidized savings accounts such as IRAs and 401(k) plans, a broad, permanent 
IDA policy would probably have only an annual match-cap structure (and no time cap).  An 
annual structure spreads out fiscal costs and may also discourage abuse; in a lifetime structure, 
someone could borrow or otherwise shift large amounts of assets into an IDA and quickly take 
advantage of an entire lifetime of match-eligibility with little new savings. 
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borrowing, and personal financial planning.  Asset-specific education deals with the purchase 
and management of assets with the proceeds of IDA savings and matches.  For example, 
education for home purchase often involves one-on-one counseling to ensure that the participants 
can demonstrate creditworthiness and that they have potential future income sufficient to repay 
debt. 
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2.  Participant Characteristics 
 
 
This chapter describes characteristics of the 2,364 ADD participants as of December 31, 2001.   
 
A participant is defined as an enrollee with at least one account statement in MIS IDA, whether 
or not the participant later dropped out of the program.  Thus, it includes enrollees who have 
account statements but who have exited without a matched withdrawal.  This definition excludes 
enrollees who never opened an account and enrollees who opened an account but who did not 
have an account statement in MIS IDA by December 31, 2001.  It also excludes people who 
opened an account but who later exited either because it was discovered that they were never 
eligible or because their circumstances (such as death or moving to a place distant from the IDA 
program) precluded them from choosing to remain as a participant. 
 
In this report, these and other descriptions of the characteristics of participants use the most 
recent data in MIS IDA.  The regression analysis in Chapter 4 uses the participant characteristics 
that were recorded at enrollment.  Unless otherwise noted, the characteristics of participants in 
ADD are defined and summarized below and in Table 2.1.  Appendix C provides demographic 
information for participants in each of the 14 IDA programs. 
 
 
ADD Participant Characteristics 
 
Demographics 
 
Gender.  Eighty percent were female. 
 
Age.  The average age at enrollment was 36, with a low of 13 and a high of 72.  About 87 
percent of participants were between 20 and 49 years of age. 
 
Race/ethnicity.  Participants identified themselves as African-American (47 percent), Caucasian 
(37 percent), Latino or Hispanic (9 percent), Native American (3 percent), Asian-American or 
Pacific-Islander (2 percent), or “other” (3 percent).   
 
Location of residence.  Eighty-six percent of participants lived in an area with a population of 
2,500 or more. 
 
Household Composition 
 
Marital status.  Participants were never-married (48 percent), married (22 percent), divorced or 
separated (27 percent), or widowed (2 percent). 
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Table 2.1 Participant Characteristics (N = 2,364) 
 
 
           Gender %
Female 80
Male 20
13 to 19 4
20s 26
30s 36
40s 25
50s 7
60 to 72 2
African-American 47
Asian-American or Pacific Islander 2
Caucasian 37
Latino or Hispanic 9
Native-American 3
Other 3
Population 2,500 or more 86
Population less than 2,500 14
Never-married 48
Married 22
Divorced or Separated 27
Widowed 2
Missing 1
One Adult with Children 44
One Adult without Children 15
Two or more Adults with Children 32
Two or more Adults without Children 9
Missing 2
0 24
1 24
2 26
3 14
4 7
5 or more 4
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
    Demographics
    Household Composition
Marital Status
Household Type
Children in Household
1 58
2 33
3 6
4 1
5 or more 1
Missing 1
Yes 6
No 94
Did not Complete High School 15
Completed High School or GED 24
Attended College but No Degree 37
Completed 2-year Degree 6
Completed Unspecified Degree 8
Completed 4-year Degree or more 10
Employed Full-time 58
Employed Part-time 20
Unemployed 7
Not Working 4
Student, not Working 5
Student, also Working 5
Yes 18
No 82
0 to 49 21
50 to 74 11
75 to 99 15
100 to 124 14
125 to 149 12
150 to 174 9
175 to 199 5
200 to 686 12
Missing 2
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (%)
    Financial
Adults in Household
Education
Employment
Multiple IDA Participants in Household
    Education and Employment
   Household Composition continued
Formerly 38
Currently 10
Yes 11
No 83
Missing* 6
Yes 16
No 77
Missing* 7
Passbook Savings Account 51
Checking 67
Both 39
Either 79
Yes 6
No 89
Missing* 5
Yes 52
No 27
Missing* 21
Yes 33
No 46
Missing* 21
Yes 2
No 98
Yes 38
No 56
Missing* 6
Yes 24
No 55
Missing* 21
Bank Account
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Employee of Host Organization
Previous Relationship with Host 
Referred by Partner Organization
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Household type.  Household types were distributed as follows:  one adult with children (44 
percent), one adult without children (15 percent), two or more adults with children (32 percent), 
or two or more adults without children (9 percent).  Regarding the largest group, one adult with 
children, 91 percent are single mothers. 
 
Children.  The average number of children was 1.7, and most households (76 percent) have at 
least one child. 
 
Adults.  The average number of adults was 1.5, and 58 percent of households have one adult. 
 
Multiple participants in household.  Some participants were in a household that had at least 
one other IDA participant (6 percent).1 
 
Education and Employment 
 
Education.  The highest grade completed corresponded to less than a high-school diploma (15 
percent), a high-school diploma or GED (24 percent), some college but no degree (37 percent), a 
2-year college degree (6 percent), a college degree with 2-year or 4-year unspecified (8 percent), 
or a 4-year college degree or more (10 percent).  Most participants (61 percent) attended some 
college. 
 
Employment status.  Participants were employed full-time (58 percent), employed part-time (20 
percent), unemployed (7 percent), not working (4 percent), a student but not working (5 percent), 
or a student and working (5 percent).  Not working includes homemakers, the retired, and the 
disabled.  Unemployed includes people who were laid-off and awaiting a call-back or who were 
seeking employment.  Almost 90 percent of participants worked or were students. 
 
Self-employed.  Some participants had business assets or self-employment income (18 percent). 
 
Financial 
 
Income.  Mean monthly household income was $1,496 (median2 $1,358, Table 2.2).  In annual 
terms, the mean was $17,952.  Recurrent income (consisting of wages, government benefits, 
pensions, and investments) was 82 percent of total income and had a mean value of $1,244 
(median $1,200).  About 78 percent of participants received wages, and 27 percent received 
government benefits.  In terms of value, 67 percent of income came from wages, and 14 percent 
came from government benefits.  Intermittent income (self-employment, child support, gifts, and 
other sources) was 18 percent of total income and had a mean monthly value of $261.  Figure 2.1 
illustrates the distribution of monthly income for all ADD participants. 
                                                 
1 MIS IDA does not explicitly record cases of multiple participants in a household; we identified 
likely candidates by hand via a combination of last names, addresses, and phone numbers. IDAs 
are held by individuals, so multiple accounts in a single household are allowed. 
2 The median has the same number of participants above it as below it. 
10   Final Report on Saving Performance in ADD 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants
 with an
 Income
 Source (%)
Distribution
 of Total
Income by
Source (%)
Wages 2,364 1,090 1,053 0 6,260 0 78 67
Government Benefits 2,364 135 0 0 3,400 0 27 14
Pensions 2,364 12 0 0 2,000 0 2 1
Investments 2,326 4 0 0 5,000 38 1 0
    Recurrent Sources 2,326 1,244 1,200 0 6,760 38 90 82
Self-employment 2,364 137 0 0 5,000 0 16 9
Child Support 2,364 51 0 0 1,833 0 15 4
Gifts 2,364 16 0 0 2,000 0 5 1
Other Sources 2,363 57 0 0 3,514 1 10 4
    Intermittent 2,363 261 0 0 5,000 1 38 18
Total Income 2,325 1,496 1,358 0 6,760 39 99 100
Income/Poverty 2,325 1.16 1.06 0.00 7.21 39
Table 2.2 Income of Participants for ADD Participants
Figure 2.1 Distribution of Monthly Income for ADD Participants 
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Income/poverty level.  On average, household income was 116 percent of the family-size-
adjusted poverty guideline (median 106 percent, Table 2.2).  About 88 percent of participants 
were under 200 percent of the poverty line (Figure 2.2). 
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Assets.  Median total assets for participants in ADD were $2,950 (Table 2.3).  A few people had 
very high assets (one reported $427,000), so the mean ($17,984) greatly exceeded the median.  
The average participant had a home value of $11,279.  For the 19 percent of participants who 
owned a home, the average home value was $59,363.  The average car value was worth $3,472.  
For the 67 percent of participants with a car, the average value was $5,182. 
 
 
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an 
Asset Type 
(%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Asset Value  
by Type (%)
Passbook Account 2,346 269 2 0 11,000 18 51 12
Checking Account 2,316 281 50 0 32,000 48 66 14
    Total Liquid Assets 2,308 554 125 0 32,005 56 78 26
Home 2,360 11,279 0 0 290,000 4 19 18
Car 2,337 3,472 1,300 0 32,000 27 67 46
Business 2,362 1,247 0 0 350,000 2 10 5
Land or Property 2,359 632 0 0 180,000 5 2 1
Investments 2,359 676 0 0 140,000 5 14 4
    Total Illiquid Assets 2,326 17,364 2,500 0 426,000 38 71 74
Total Assets 2,277 17,984 2,950 0 427,000 87 88 100
Total Liabilities 2,294 13,596 2,875 0 272,700 70
        Net Worth 2,226 4,039 330 -230,550 349,000 138
Table 2.3 Assets of Participants for ADD Participants
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Liability 
Value by 
Type (%)
Home Mortgage 2,361 7,275 0 0 185,000 3 16 18
Car Loan 2,344 1,855 0 0 30,000 20 26 20
Business Loan 2,359 245 0 0 130,000 5 2 1
Land or Property 
Mortgage 2,363 226 0 0 90,000 1 1 1
Family and Friends Debt 2,355 459 0 0 120,000 9 20 8
Household Bills 2,351 177 0 0 30,000 13 25 10
Medical Bills 2,358 506 0 0 150,000 6 23 10
Credit-card 2,336 897 0 0 60,000 28 32 18
Student Loans 2,357 1,941 0 0 140,000 7 18 15
    Total Liabilities 2,294 13,596 2,875 0 272,700 70 75 100
Total Assets 2,277 17,984 2,950 0 427,000 87 88
    Net Worth 2,226 4,039 330 -230,550 349,000 138
Table 2.4 Liabilities of Participants for ADD Participants
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Liabilities.  Median total liabilities in ADD were $2,875 (Table 2.4).  A few people had very 
high debts (one reported $272,700), so the mean ($13,596) greatly exceeded the median.  The 
average participant had home-mortgage debt of $7,275.  For the 16 percent of participants who 
had a home mortgage, average home-mortgage debt was $45,468.  In addition, the average 
participant had a car loan of $1,855.  For the 26 percent who had a car loan, the average car loan 
was $7,134.  
 
Net worth.  Mean net worth (total assets minus total liabilities) of participants was $4,039 
(median $330, Table 2.3).  Figure 2.3 illustrates the distribution of total net worth for all ADD 
participants. 
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Life-insurance coverage.  One-third of participants had life insurance (33 percent).   
 
Relationship with Host Organization or Partner Organizations 
 
Employee of host organization.  Two percent of participants were employees at the host 
organization of the IDA program. 
 
Previous relationship with host organization.  Many participants had received services from 
the host organization before the IDA program (38 percent). 
 
Referred by partner organization.  Twenty-four percent of participants were referred to the 
IDA program by a partner organization. 
 
 
ADD Participants 
 
Eligibility for participation in ADD varied among programs.  The IDA programs typically 
targeted individuals either at or below 150 percent of the poverty line, or at or below 200 percent 
of the poverty line.  Compared to the U.S. low-income population,3 ADD participants are better 
educated, more likely to be employed, and more likely to have a bank account (See Sherraden et 
al., 2000 for discussion).  This pattern probably reflects the explicit targeting of programs in 
ADD to the “working poor.”  Participants in ADD are also more likely to be female, African-
American, and never-married.  This pattern likely reflects the populations served by the 
community-development, social-service, and housing organizations in ADD. 
 
                                                 
3 Comparison statistics used the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from the 
U.S. Census Bureau.  The data come from the ninth wave of the 1993 SIPP panel and refer to 
September 1995.  The sample includes individuals 18-years-old and older in households with 
income at or below 200 percent of the family-size adjusted poverty threshold (not guideline).   
 Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
3. Deposits, Withdrawals, and Saving Outcomes 
 
 
This chapter presents data from ADD through December 31, 2001, on deposits, unmatched 
withdrawals, matched withdrawals, and the uses of matched withdrawals.  These aggregate 
outcomes matter not only because they suggest how people save in IDAs but also because they 
may inform efforts to expand access to IDAs.  For example, financial intermediaries that might 
hold IDAs would want to know the likely number, frequency, and size of deposits and 
withdrawals.  Likewise, new IDA programs may use the figures to plan and to set benchmarks.  
Appendix C provides additional saving information for each of the 14 IDA programs. 
 
MIS IDA records the following savings outcomes for the 2,364 ADD participants as of 
December 31, 2001.  Savers refer to those participants with net deposits of $100 or more.   
 
• About 32 percent of participants had made matched withdrawals. 
 
• About 64 percent had made unmatched withdrawals from matchable balances. 
 
• Net deposits for the average participant were $528. 
 
• Net deposits plus match per participant were $1,543. 
 
• Average monthly net deposits per participant were $19.07 ($33.81 for the 1,324 participants 
referred to as savers).   
 
• On average, a year of participation produced net deposits of about $229. 
 
• With an average match rate of about 2:1, participants accumulated approximately $700 per 
year in IDAs. 
 
• On average, each participant made a deposit in about 6 of 12 months. 
 
• On average, participants saved 51 cents for every dollar that could have been matched. 
 
• The average savings rate was 1.6 percent of monthly income. 
 
 
Deposits 
 
Net deposits in IDAs result from a number of types of cash flows, both deposits and withdrawals.  
Figure 3.1 depicts cumulative deposits and withdrawals in ADD through December 31, 2001. 
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Gross deposits are defined as cash flows into an IDA, including interest net of bank fees.  As of 
December 31, 2001, cumulative gross deposits by the 2,364 participants in ADD were 
$2,530,538 (Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1).  All participants except twelve made a deposit, and the 
gross deposit per participant was $1,059.  The average length of participation was 24.5 months, 
and the average number of months per year with a deposit was about 6 (deposit frequency was 
48 percent).  Gross deposits per month in all months were $40.  Excluding months without 
deposits, gross deposits per month were $83. 
 
Total unmatched withdrawals are defined as cash flows out of an IDA back to a participant that 
are not matched.  As of December 31, 2001, cumulative unmatched withdrawals in ADD were 
$1,174,970 (Table 3.1). 
Figure 3.1 
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Total unmatched withdrawals have two components:  unmatched withdrawals of excess 
balances, and unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances. 
 
Unmatched withdrawals of excess balances are defined as withdrawals of balances in excess of 
the match cap.  There is no loss of a potential match because excess balances are not matchable.  
Through December 31, 2001, cumulative unmatched withdrawals of excess balances in ADD 
were $494,770 (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1).  About 25 percent of participants made, on average, 
2.5 withdrawals of this type, and the average withdrawal was worth $336 (total $839; Table 3.6). 
 
Unmatched withdrawals of matchable balances are defined as cash flows out of an IDA back to 
a participant that could have been matched but were withdrawn for a non-matchable use.  There 
is a loss of a potential match. As of December 31, 2001, cumulative unmatched withdrawals in 
ADD were $680,200 (Table 3.1).  About 64 percent of the participants made these withdrawals 
(Table 3.6).   
 
Excess balances are defined as balances in excess of the match cap.1  As of December 31, 2001, 
excess balances in ADD were $106,890 (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1).  About 19 percent of 
participants had excess balances, and the average value for this group was $235. 
 
Net deposits are defined as matchable balances, that is, gross deposits minus total unmatched 
withdrawals.  As of December 31, 2001, cumulative net deposits in ADD were $1,248,678 
(Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1).  Average net deposits for all participants were $528.   
                                                 
1 For participants with annual match-cap structures, the total match cap increases with each year 
of participation, so excess balances in month 12 or 24 may become matchable in month 13 or 25. 
Type of cash flow Amount Match
Amount plus 
Match
Gross deposits 2,530,538   
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 494,770       
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 680,200       
Total unmatched withdrawals (1,174,970)  
Excess balances (106,890)     
Net deposits 1,248,678   2,399,470           3,648,149         
    Match-eligible balance 586,552       1,153,652           1,740,204         
    Matched withdrawals 662,127       1,245,818           1,907,945         
Table 3.1 Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative)
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The average match rate per dollar of net deposits was approximately 1.92:1, so the match that 
corresponded to net deposits was $2,399,470 (Table 3.1).  If all net deposits were used in 
matched withdrawals, total asset accumulation would be $3,648,149.  With all participants 
included, this is $1,543 per participant; with only savers2 included, it is $2,755 per participant.  
 
Net deposits have two components:  match-eligible balances and matched withdrawals. 
 
Match-eligible balances are defined as balances under the match cap (adjusted for previous 
matched withdrawals) that may be matched.  In ADD as of December 31, 2001, the match-
eligible balance was $586,552 (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1).  The match rate per dollar of these 
balances was 1.97:1, so the potential match was $1,153,652 for a total potential asset 
accumulation of $1,740,204. 
 
Matched withdrawals are defined as withdrawals for matchable uses.  Cumulative matched 
withdrawals in ADD through December 31, 2001 were $662,127 (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1).  
The match rate per dollar of matched withdrawals was 1.88:1, so the match disbursed was 
$1,245,818.  Cumulative actual asset accumulation through matched withdrawals was 
$1,907,945. 
 
 
Matched Withdrawals 
 
About 32 percent of ADD participants had made a matched withdrawal as of December 31, 
2001.  The average value of matched withdrawals per participant with at least one matched 
withdrawal was $878, and the value of the matched withdrawals plus matches per participant 
with a matched withdrawal was $2,586 (Table 3.2). 
 
ADVOCAP had the highest proportion of participants with a matched withdrawal (65 percent); 
WSEP had the lowest (17 percent).  Differences among programs are due at least in part to 
differences in length of participation and drop-out rate.  Although matched deposits ended as of 
December 31, 2001, matched withdrawals can still be made through June 30, 2002. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Savers are participants who had net savings of $100 or more as of December 31, 2001. 
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 1,910
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 754
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $347
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 32
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 2.5
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $878
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $2,586
Table 3.2 Matched Withdrawals
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Intended uses.  As of December 31, 2001, 68 percent of ADD participants had not made a 
matched withdrawal.  Of these, 58 percent reported that they intend to buy a home, 16 percent 
intend to spend it on microenterprise, and 14 percent to enroll in post-secondary education 
(Table 3.3).  Among savers, 43 percent have not yet taken a matched withdrawal, and intend to 
spend their money similarly (55 percent for home purchase, 18 percent for microenterprise, and 
14 percent for post-secondary education). 
 
 
 
 
Uses of matched withdrawals.  Matches are restricted to withdrawals used to invest in specific 
assets:  home purchase or repair, post-secondary education, microenterprise, retirement or job 
training.  As of December 31, 2001, the most common use for participants taking matched 
withdrawals was home purchase (28 percent), followed by microenterprise (23 percent), post-
secondary education (21 percent), and home repair (18 percent, Table 3.4).  A few participants 
made matched withdrawals for retirement (7 percent) or job training (2 percent).  
 
 
 
 
Value of Matched Withdrawals.  Table 3.5 shows that, on a per-participant basis, the largest 
value of matched withdrawals were for home purchase ($782) and for retirement ($713).  
Matched withdrawals per participant were $437 for home repair, $402 for microenterprise, and 
$374 for post-secondary education.  Withdrawals for job training averaged $263.3 
                                                 
3 As ADD culminates, matched withdrawals per participant—for all uses—will increase.  Thus, 
these figures will differ after all participants have made whatever matched withdrawals that they 
will make.  
Use Participants 
(%)
# of Withdrawals 
(%)
Value
 (%)
Value plus Match 
(%)
Average Match 
Rate
Home Purchase 28 21 33 35 2.1
Microenterprise 23 28 19 20 2.0
Post-secondary Ed. 21 22 16 16 2.0
Home Repair 18 21 20 20 1.8
Retirement 7 6 11 8 1.1
Job Training 2 2 1 1 2.0
Table 3.4 Distribution of Actual Use of Matched Withdrawals 
for Participants with Matched Withdrawals
Use Participants (%)
Home Purchase 58
Microenterprise 16
Post-secondary Education 14
Home Repair 4
Retirement 4
Job Training 2
Table 3.3 Distribution of Intended Use of Matched Withdrawals 
for Participants without a Matched Withdrawal
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Unmatched Withdrawals 
 
Unmatched withdrawals are all removals of match-eligible balances; therefore, there is a loss of 
potential match funds.  This includes funds withdrawn and not matched upon exit from ADD, 
balances left in an account upon exit (when withdrawn, these funds will not be matched), and 
funds withdrawn but not matched during participation.   
 
As of December 31, 2001, 64 percent of participants had unmatched withdrawals (3.6 
withdrawals per participant with an unmatched withdrawal).  The average unmatched withdrawal 
was worth $124 ($451 per participant with an unmatched withdrawal; Table 3.6).   
 
 
 
 
Savings Outcomes 
 
Saving and asset accumulation in IDAs are built up from several elements.  Deposits and interest 
increase balances; fees and withdrawals (matched or unmatched) decrease balances.  Match rates 
affect total accumulation, and income affects the level of resources available to be saved.  No 
single number captures everything about each element.  Six measures summarize the combined 
effects of different elements on savings outcomes in ADD:  net deposits, net deposits plus match, 
average monthly net deposits, deposit frequency, net deposits as a percentage of the match cap, 
and savings rate.  (For further discussion of measures of financial savings, see Schreiner, 2001b).  
 
The shaded boxes on the following pages illustrate the six savings outcomes for a hypothetical 
IDA. 
Item Total
From Excess 
Balances
From Matchable 
Balances
Value ($) 1,174,970 494,770 680,200
Number 6,940 1,473 5,467
Percentage of Participants with a Withdrawal 72 25 64
Average Amount Withdrawn 169 336 124
Withdrawals per Participant with a Withdrawal 4.1 2.5 3.6
Value per Participant with a Withdrawal ($) 687 839 451
Table 3.6 Unmatched Withdrawals
Use Value ($) Value plus Match ($) # of Withdrawals
Home Purchase 782 2,416 1.6
Microenterprise 402 1,222 2.6
Post-secondary Ed. 374 1,105 2.4
Home Repair 437 1,212 2.5
Retirement 713 1,515 1.9
Job Training 263 803 2.5
Other 391 1,049 5.1
Table 3.5 Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal
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Net Deposits 
 
Net deposits are defined as deposits plus interest (net of fees) minus unmatched withdrawals.  
The measure includes matched withdrawals, but it excludes deposits in excess of the match cap 
or after the time cap.  Unmatched withdrawals are savings in an IDA account, but they cannot be 
matched, so they are not counted as net deposits. 
 
Net deposits measure assets accumulated in an IDA up to a point in time.  Greater net deposits 
imply greater asset accumulation.  The measure does not account, however, for differences in the 
length of participation, time caps, or the timing of cash flows.   
 
Average net deposits in ADD as of December 31, 2001 were $528 (Table 3.7).  The median was 
$283.  The smallest net deposit was $-563,4 and the largest net deposit was $6,000.  About 35 
percent (816 participants) had zero net deposits, 5 and 44 percent had saved less than $100.  
Average net deposits for participants with positive net deposits were $807. 
 
 
 
 
This measure does not control for differences across programs (for example, participant or 
institutional characteristics, or start date), so cross-program comparisons are not appropriate.  In 
fact, net deposits is not a very useful measure because it does not control for length of 
participation; all else constant, participants who started sooner will have higher net deposits. 
                                                 
4 Negative balances result from overdrafts made on IDA accounts. 
5 All of these cases had made deposits but then had removed them in unmatched withdrawals. 
Program N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($)
ADVOCAP 82 626 995 0 1,000
CAAB 142 463 188 0 2,908
CVCAC 154 676 638 0 2,000
Near Eastside 190 219 0 0 900
Heart of America 91 708 741 0 1,620
Mercy Corps 118 549 0 0 2,000
MACED 65 237 360 0 360
CAPTC Small-scale 163 994 614 -72 3,000
Shorebank 203 251 52 -61 1,000
WSEP 231 161 0 0 600
Alternatives FCU 91 1,068 1,263 0 1,958
Foundation Communities 125 666 0 0 6,000
Bay Area 239 476 583 -88 1,920
CAPTC Large-scale 470 632 216 -563 2,250
All ADD 2,364 528 283 -563 6,000
Table 3.7  Net Deposits by Program
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Savings Outcomes for a Hypothetical IDA 
 
To illustrate the measures of savings outcomes, the table and figure below show cash flows for a 
hypothetical IDA account and the evolution of the balance. 
 
The example participant opened the account on January 1.  The match rate was 2:1, the match-
cap structure was annual, the annual match cap was $300, the time cap was 12 months, the total 
match cap was $300, and there were no fees.  The first deposit of $100 was on February 1.  On 
March 1, $1.00 of interest (a monthly rate of 1 percent) was credited. (The unrealistically high 
interest rate of one percent per month is used here only for illustration. The hypothetical example 
is not meant to represent the typical experience in ADD in any way.)  On April 1, there was an 
unmatched withdrawal of $25 and an interest credit of $1.01.  On May 1, the participant 
deposited $50, and $0.77 in interest was credited.  Finally, on June 1, five months after the 
account was opened, interest of $1.28 was credited, and the participant closed the account with a 
matched withdrawal of $129.06. 
 
In this example, net deposits were $129.06.  This is the sum of deposits ($100 + $50 = $150) and 
interest ($1.00 + $1.01 + $0.77 + $1.28 = $4.06), minus unmatched withdrawals ($25). 
 
Cash Flows in a Hypothetical IDA in Dollars 
Date Deposit Interest Matched withdrawal Unmatched withdrawal Balance 
Jan. 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Feb. 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
March 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 101.00 
April 1 0.00 1.01 0.00 25.00 77.01 
May 1 50.00 0.77 0.00 0.00 127.78 
June 1 0.00 1.28 129.06 0.00 0.00 
      
Total 150.00 4.06 129.06 25.00 N/A 
Monthly interest is 1 percent, the match rate is 2:1, the total match cap is $300, and the time cap is 12 months. 
 Evolution of the Balance of a Hypothetical IDA 
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Net Deposits plus Match 
Net deposits plus match is defined as net deposits plus the corresponding match.6 Net deposits 
includes any previous matched withdrawals. This measure tells the asset accumulation that 
would take place through IDAs if all net deposits were used in matched withdrawals. 
Example:  Net Deposits plus Match 
 
In the hypothetical example, net deposits were $129.06, and the match rate was 2:1.  Net deposits 
plus match were thus $387.18, found as $129.06 + 2·$129.06. 
 
The average net deposits plus match in ADD were $1,543, and the median was $817 (Table 3.8).  
The smallest net deposit plus match was -$1,127, and the largest net deposit plus match was 
$18,000.7 
 
 
 
 
Like net deposits, the measure of net deposits plus match has some drawbacks.  It does not 
control for length of participation, and it depends on the match rate, which is not an outcome of 
participant behavior but rather an element of the institutional structure set by the program. 
                                                 
6 Of course, some current match-eligible balances may be removed as unmatched withdrawals. 
7 Foundation Communities allows participants to have more than one IDA account.  In effect, the 
multiple accounts increase the annual match cap for individuals.   
Program N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($)
ADVOCAP 82 1,878 2,986 0 3,000
CAAB 142 1,943 644 0 8,725
CVCAC 154 1,840 1,681 0 6,000
Near Eastside 190 926 0 0 4,200
Heart of America 91 2,123 2,223 0 4,860
Mercy Corps 118 1,098 0 0 4,000
MACED 65 1,395 1,080 0 2,520
CAPTC Small-scale 163 2,386 1,228 -72 9,000
Shorebank 203 593 111 -61 2,000
WSEP 231 558 0 0 3,000
Alternatives FCU 91 4,273 5,053 0 7,833
Foundation Communities 125 2,007 0 0 18,000
Bay Area 239 1,415 1,688 -88 5,760
CAPTC Large-scale 470 1,552 555 -563 6,750
All ADD 2,364 1,543 817 -563 18,000
Table 3.8 Cumulative Net Deposits plus Match by Program
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Average Monthly Net Deposit 
 
Average monthly net deposit (AMND) is defined as net deposits per month of participation for a 
participant.  In this report, AMND is the key measure of savings outcomes.  Unlike net deposits, 
AMND controls for the length of time that a participant has had the opportunity to save.  All else 
constant, greater AMND implies greater asset accumulation. 
 
Example:  Average Monthly Net Deposit 
 
The example participant was in the IDA program for 5 months.  Net deposits were $129.06, so 
the average monthly net deposit for this example participant was $25.81, found as $129.06 ÷ 5. 
 
 
For ADD as of December 31, 2001, average AMND was $19.07 (median $9.83).  Thus, a year of 
participation produced net deposits of about $229.  Among the fourteen programs, AMND 
ranged from a low of $7.76 to a high of $41.68 (Table 3.9).  Cross program comparisons are 
inappropriate unless they control for cross-program differences.  The regression in Chapter 4 
does this. 
 
 
 
 
As of December 31, 2001, there were 1,548 participants with positive net deposits (this figure 
excludes participants with zero account balances).  The average AMND for those participants 
with positive net deposits was $29.16 (median $24.83).  The range among programs was a low of 
$10.97 and a high of  $56.96 (Table 3.10).   
 
AMND was $33.81 for saversthose participants with net deposits of $100 or more. 
Program N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($)
ADVOCAP 82 41.68 41.67 0.00 250.00
CAAB 142 21.29 5.79 0.00 171.43
CVCAC 154 20.15 20.03 0.00 45.45
Near Eastside 190 9.50 0.00 0.00 55.56
Heart of America 91 16.89 16.88 0.00 35.98
Mercy Corps 118 19.55 0.00 0.00 125.00
MACED 65 7.76 9.00 0.00 15.65
CAPTC Small-scale 163 23.44 14.54 -2.32 78.93
Shorebank 203 10.12 1.89 -2.53 71.43
WSEP 231 8.29 0.00 0.00 100.00
Alternatives FCU 91 28.16 39.20 0.00 47.98
Foundation Communities 125 20.79 0.00 0.00 153.85
Bay Area 239 23.54 19.35 -6.78 240.00
CAPTC Large-scale 470 23.00 9.27 -25.61 90.00
All ADD 2,364 19.07 9.83 -25.61 250.00
Table 3.9 Average Monthly Net Deposit by Program
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Deposit Frequency 
 
Deposit frequency is defined as the number of months with a deposit divided by the number of 
months of participation.  It shows how steadily a participant saves through time.  A participant 
with a deposit each month has a deposit frequency of 100 percent.  As a participant misses 
months, the measure gets smaller; someone with no deposits at all has a frequency of zero.  
Deposits of accrued interest are ignored; if not, frequency would be 100 percent for most 
participants. 
 
Example:  Deposit Frequency 
 
The example participant made deposits in 2 of 5 months, so deposit frequency was 40 percent. 
 
 
The mean deposit frequency for ADD was 48 percent, and the median was 44 percent.  The 
typical IDA participant made a deposit in about six of twelve months.  Deposit frequency among 
the programs varies from 28 percent to 70 percent (Table 3.11). 
 
Program N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($)
ADVOCAP 60 56.96 41.67 0.80 250.00
CAAB 72 41.99 33.33 4.67 171.43
CVCAC 114 27.23 31.31 0.28 45.45
Near Eastside 94 19.19 18.19 0.20 55.56
Heart of America 71 21.64 21.09 0.22 35.98
Mercy Corps 56 41.19 42.48 0.17 125.00
MACED 46 10.97 11.03 2.77 15.65
CAPTC Small-scale 115 33.25 31.49 0.00 78.93
Shorebank 125 16.53 14.29 0.06 71.43
WSEP 88 21.77 23.07 1.03 100.00
Alternatives FCU 75 34.17 41.09 0.77 47.98
Foundation Communities 54 48.14 41.60 13.74 153.85
Bay Area 179 31.47 24.00 0.02 240.00
CAPTC Large-scale 399 27.18 18.99 0.00 90.00
All ADD 1,548 29.16 24.38 0.00 250.00
Table 3.10 Average Net Deposit for Participants with Positive Net Deposits
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Net Deposits as a Percentage of the Match Cap 
 
Net deposits as a percentage of the match cap is defined as the ratio of the average monthly net 
deposits to the monthly savings target.  The monthly savings target is the total match cap divided 
by the time cap, that is, the amount that, if deposited each month and not removed as an 
unmatched withdrawal, would lead to net deposits equal to the lifetime match cap in the month 
before the time cap. 
 
Example:  Net Deposits as a Percentage of the Match Cap 
 
For the example participant, the monthly savings target is $25, found as the match cap of $300 
divided by the time cap of twelve months.  Because the average monthly net deposit was $25.81, 
the proportion of savings goal was 103 percent, found as $25.81 ÷ $25.  The participant was 
slightly ahead of the pace required to use all match eligibility before the 12-month time cap. 
 
 
The measure of net deposits as a percentage of the match cap indicates the closeness of actual 
saving behavior to that which would take full advantage of match incentives.  A measure of 100 
percent indicates that a participant is on track to use all match eligibility.  Measures above 100 
percent are possible if deposits are on a pace to exceed the total match cap or if a participant has 
an annual match-cap structure and has deposited more than would be matched if participation 
were to end after the current participation-year.   
 
For ADD, net deposits were, on average, 51 percent of the match cap, and the median was 26 
percent (Table 3.12).  That is, the average participant saved 51 cents for every dollar that could 
Program N Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
ADVOCAP 82 49 46 7 100
CAAB 142 41 36 5 100
CVCAC 154 42 36 0 100
Near Eastside 190 45 42 0 100
Heart of America 91 56 54 12 100
Mercy Corps 118 50 44 7 100
MACED 65 32 27 5 100
CAPTC Small-scale 163 61 68 7 100
Shorebank 203 28 21 4 100
WSEP 231 41 38 0 100
Alternatives FCU 91 70 75 10 98
Foundation Communities 125 45 36 5 100
Bay Area 239 39 35 4 100
CAPTC Large-scale 470 61 66 0 100
All ADD 2,364 48 44 0 100
(Months with a Deposit/Months of Participation)
Table 3.11 Deposit Frequency by Program
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have been matched.  Among participants with positive net deposits, net deposits were 78 percent 
of the match cap. 
 
 
 
 
 
Savings Rate 
 
The savings rate is defined as the ratio of the average monthly net deposit to gross monthly 
household income.  It measures the rate at which inflows of resources are converted into IDA 
deposits. 
 
 
Example:  Savings Rate 
 
If the example participant had monthly household income of $1,250, then net deposits as a 
percentage of income would be about 2.1 percent, found as $25.81 ÷ $1,250. 
 
 
The average savings rate for ADD was 1.6 percent, and the median was 0.7 percent (Table 3.13).  
The lowest rate was 0.7 percent (Near Eastside and WSEP) and the highest was 2.9 percent 
(ADVOCAP and Alternatives FCU).  The largest saving rate for an individual participant was 45 
percent, probably by someone who understated her/his income or who had unusually low income 
in the month of enrollment. 
Program N Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
ADVOCAP 82 100 100 0 600
CAAB 142 68 8 0 600
CVCAC 154 46 45 0 108
Near Eastside 190 51 0 0 456
Heart of America 91 46 46 0 108
Mercy Corps 118 41 0 0 160
MACED 65 81 100 0 173
CAPTC Small-scale 163 35 23 -3 117
Shorebank 203 36 6 -6 240
WSEP 231 35 0 0 480
Alternatives FCU 91 68 94 0 115
Foundation Communities 125 32 0 0 171
Bay Area 239 98 100 -37 509
CAPTC Large-scale 470 37 15 -41 144
All ADD 2,364 51 26 -41 600
Table 3.12 Net Deposit as a Percentage 
of the Match Cap by Program
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As income increases, the savings rate decreases (Table 3.14).  Participants in the lowest income 
group saved 3.1 percent of their income in IDAs, while participants in the highest income group 
saved 0.9 percent.  Note, however, that these results are not controlling for any other variables. 
 
 
 
 
Program N Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
ADVOCAP 82 2.9 2.1 0.0 25
CAAB 142 1.5 0.5 0.0 24
CVCAC 150 2.2 1.7 0.0 16
Near Eastside 190 0.9 0.0 0.0 11
Heart of America 84 1.3 0.9 0.0 6
Mercy Corps 118 1.6 0.0 0.0 45
MACED 62 0.7 0.7 0.0 3
CAPTC Small-scale 160 1.6 0.8 -0.1 17
Shorebank 201 0.8 0.1 -0.7 13
WSEP 225 0.7 0.0 0.0 6
Alternatives FCU 86 2.9 2.0 0.0 31
Foundation Communities 125 1.4 0.0 0.0 9
Bay Area 235 2.1 1.4 -1.4 15
CAPTC Large-scale 450 1.8 0.8 -2.9 32
All ADD 2,310 1.6 0.7 -2.9 45
Table 3.13 Savings Rate by Program
Income N Mean (%) Median (%) Min. (%) Max. (%)
>$0 to $559 217 3.1 0.0 -1.4 45
>$560 to $799 214 2.6 1.4 -0.7 24
>$800 to $995 229 1.9 0.6 -2.9 25
>$996 to $1,199 235 1.4 0.4 -0.1 11
>$1,200 to $1,326 251 1.3 0.5 -0.1 7
>$1,327 to $1,515 234 1.4 0.6 0.0 15
>$1,516 to $1,759 222 1.2 0.7 0.0 7
>$1,760 to $1,999 242 1.0 0.6 0.0 13
>$2,000 to $2,459 232 1.1 0.8 -0.1 7
>$2,460 to $6,628 234 0.9 0.7 0.0 6
All ADD 2,310 1.6 0.7 -2.9 45
Table 3.14 Savings Rate by Monthly Income
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4.  Saving Performance and  
Institutional and Participant Characteristics  
 
 
As of December 31, 2001, fifty-six percent of enrollees in ADD were savers, defined as 
participants who saved a net of $100 or more.  Low-savers saved up to a net $100 and 
maintained assets for a time, but they also dissaved or became ineligible for matches.  This 
distinction matters for IDA policy because low-savers are costly; programs lose their investment 
in participants, and participants lose potential match funds.  Long-term implications for 
participants with low savings in IDAs are unknown.  They may become discouraged with saving 
in general, or this introduction to saving may lead to more successful saving in the future.   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, average monthly net deposits (AMND) are defined as net 
deposits divided by months of participation.1  In this report, AMND is the key outcome measure; 
greater AMND implies greater savings and asset accumulation in IDAs. 
 
This chapter examines the links between the probability of a participant being a saver and the 
characteristics of institutions and participants.  It also examines the links between AMND for 
savers and the characteristics of institutions and participants.  Results are sometimes compared 
with findings for ADD through June 30, 2000 (Schreiner et al., 2001).  The intent is to increase 
knowledge about IDAs that might guide program design and public policy. 
 
The key associations are: 
 
• Higher match rates, higher match caps, and use of direct deposit are associated with an 
increased likelihood of being a saver. 
 
• Up to a point, the number of hours of financial education is positively associated with 
AMND. 
 
• Hispanics, Asian Americans, and “other” ethnicities are most likely to be savers. 
 
• Race/ethnicity is associated with AMND.  Compared with Caucasians, AMND is lower 
for Native Americans and African Americans. 
 
• Participants with more education, and students who are working are more likely to be 
savers.  
 
• Neither greater recurrent income nor greater intermittent income has much of an effect on 
the likelihood of being a saver or on the level of savings. 
 
• Neither former nor current receipt of public assistance is associated with being a saver or 
with AMND. 
                                                 
1 Net deposits are gross deposits minus total unmatched withdrawals. 
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• Homeowners and car owners are more likely to be savers and to have higher AMND.  
 
• Compared to someone with no debt, participants with debt are less likely to be savers and 
have lower AMND. 
 
 
Data Analysis  
 
The analysis strategy here is similar to that in Schreiner et al. (2001).  In the first step of the 
Heckman two-step regression, however, this report examines low-saversdefined as 
participants with net deposits of $100 or less as of December 31, 2001whereas Schreiner et al. 
(2001) examined exitsdefined as those who were marked by program staff in MIS IDA as 
leaving ADD through drop-out or kick-out.  Details regarding the theory, analysis strategy, and 
regression model are in Schreiner et al. (2001).   
 
Although the regression includes an unusually large number of controls, no regression can 
control for everything.2  When possible, the regression controls for unobserved factors correlated 
with observed factors.  For example, the estimated link between gender and AMND reflects not 
the effects of gender per se but rather the effects of unobserved factors linked with gender.  Of 
course, unobserved factors omitted from the model, if correlated with both observed factors in 
the model and with AMND, can impart a bias to the estimates.   
 
 
Regression Results 
 
Regression estimates the sign (positive or negative), size, and statistical significance of 
associations between an outcome (likelihood of being a saver or level of AMND) and participant 
characteristics assumed to influence the outcome.   
 
The regression tables on the following pages contain the: 
 
• means of the characteristics in the model for savers  
 
• estimated predicted likelihood of being a saver (in percentage points)  
 
• changes in AMND (in units of dollars of net deposits per month) given a unit increase in 
a given characteristic, and the p-value of the estimated change3   
 
All results in the 7 tables come from a single two-step regression.   
                                                 
2 Control variables were selected if they were expected to influence the likelihood of being a 
saver or AMND, appeared in MIS IDA, and had sufficient variation.  Including variables for 
missing data, different attributes of a given characteristic, and non-linear effects, 84 parameters 
were estimated.   
3 Appendix D discusses the terms mean, change in percentage points, and p-value. 
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Overall, more effects are statistically significant in the regression on the likelihood of being a 
saver than in the regression on the level of AMND for savers.  This may reflect closer links 
between the characteristics of participants and programs and the likelihood of being a saver than 
with the level of AMND.  It may also reflect the fact that the AMND regression includes only 
savers and thus has only 56 percent as many observations as does the first-step regression. 
 
Institutional Characteristics4 
 
Match rate.  Similar to our previous report (Schreiner et al., 2001), the match rate has a strong 
positive association with the likelihood of being a saver.  The difference between a 3:1 match 
rate versus a 4:1 to 7:1 match rate is about 12 percentage points (Table 4.1), a large effect given 
that 44 percent of ADD participants are low-savers.  Similarly, the difference between a 1:1 or 
2:1 match rate and a 3:1 match rate is 13 percentage points.  Higher match rates may encourage 
people to save and continue program participation. 
 
As before, the match rate has no statistically significant link with AMND.  Given the effects of 
endogeniety (e.g., programs setting match rates based on what they think people can save; see 
Sherraden et al., 2000) and censoring (even if desired savings responds to changes in match 
rates, actual savings may change little or not at all, due to the match cap; see Schreiner, 2001), 
the results for match rates and AMND may or may not be misleading.   
 
Match cap/monthly savings target.  In Schreiner et al. (2001), the match cap had a small 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of exit.  In this analysis it has a large, statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood of being a saver.  An additional $10 of match cap per month 
would increase the likelihood of being a saver by about 3 percentage points.   
 
An additional $1.00 of match cap is associated with an increase of $0.70 in AMND (Table 4.1).  
We cannot conclude that the match cap pulls savings up, because the match cap also censors 
savings.  Because ADD participants can only save up to the match cap, observed savings may 
not be the same as desired savings.5   
 
Match cap structure.  Having a lifetime match-cap structure rather than an annual one is 
associated with an increased likelihood of being a saver, although the effect is not statistically 
significant.  If this relationship exists, one possible explanation is irregular income flows, which 
are more common among low-income people.  ADD participants may not have much income in 
a given year, may not have saved the maximum, and the annual caps preclude making it up the 
                                                 
4 Because the regression includes program-level dummy variables (fixed effects), the estimates 
for program characteristics are derived from within-program variation in these characteristics.  
For a given program characteristic, some programs exhibit no within-program variation, thereby 
reducing the statistical strength of the estimate of the "true" influence of the program 
characteristic.  Still, the fixed-effect model is preferred deriving estimates from cross-sectional 
(between-program) variation in program characteristics because much of the between-program 
variation in the dependent variables could plausibly be attributed to other factors besides 
between-program variation in program characteristics. 
5 About 32 percent of savers are within $1 of their match cap. 
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next year.  Another possible explanation is psychological.  People with annual match caps may 
get discouraged when they lose match eligibility with the passing of each year, whereas people 
with lifetime caps keep expecting that they will take full advantage of the match with large 
deposits at the end of participation. 
 
 
 
 
Lifetime structures are also associated with higher AMND (approximately $5 per month, Table 
4.1), but, again, the effect is not significant.  Perhaps the effect of irregular cash flows of poor 
people is so strong that, although people can save, they need time to wait for big cash flows that 
sometimes come along. 
 
Use of direct deposit.  Direct deposit use is linked with an increase in the probability of being a 
saver by 22 percentage points (Table 4.1).  This is a large effect, with obvious policy 
implications.   
 
Direct deposit appears to help people stay in the program, but not to help them save more.  Why 
wouldn’t the use of direct deposit be associated with higher AMND among savers?  It could be 
that people who sign up for direct deposit elect to contribute smaller, conservative monthly 
Independent variable Mean ∆ % pt. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Match rate
1:1 0.27 -25 0.01 0.28 -2.0 0.67
2:1 0.53 -25 0.01 0.53 -2.6 0.55
3:1 0.16 -12 0.09 0.16 2.5 0.53
4:1 to 7:1 0.06 0.06
Match cap
Monthly savings target 42 0.28 0.01 43 0.70 0.01
Match-cap structure
Annual 0.52 0.51
Lifetime 0.48 6.5 0.32 0.49 4.9 0.18
Use of direct deposit to IDA account
No 0.94 0.92
Yes 0.06 22 0.01 0.08 -1.2 0.66
Hours of general financial education
Total (spline) 12.2 12.8
More than zero 2.0 0.77
1 to 8 8.1 8.2 1.3 0.05
9 to 16 3.4 3.8 0.36 0.28
17 or more 0.7 0.9 0.19 0.51
Means taken over only non-missing observations.
AMND for Savers
(Mean = $33.81)
Probability Saver
(56%)
Table 4.1  Institutional Characteristics
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amounts because they know that future deposits will be regular and asset accumulation in IDAs 
reasonably certain.  Another possibility is that participants choose to save smaller amounts in 
order to eliminate the risk of being short of necessary cash or of creating an overdraft in the 
account funding the IDA. 
 
General financial education.  Unlike in the previous report, the endogeniety of hours of 
financial education is no longer a concern.  First, asset-specific hours are omitted because they 
depend on staying in the program and then on saving enough to get close to making a matched 
withdrawal.  Second, everyone who was a saver by December 31, 2001 has had a full 
opportunity to take all the general financial education offered by the program. 
 
For AMND, people with no hours save $2 less than people with some hours (Table 4.1).  For 
people with some hours, the effect is strong for 1 to 8 hours ($1.3 dollars of AMND per 
additional hour), but then gets weaker (and statistically insignificant) for 9 to 16 hours and then 
again for 17 hours or more.  In short, a small number of financial-education hours is associated 
with an increase in savings, but after 8 to 10 hours, additional hours does not have a link with 
saving.  Figure 4.1 illustrates the link between AMND and hours of general financial education.6 
 
Endogeniety issues preclude an examination of the link between financial education and the 
likelihood of being a saver.  People who dropped out quickly may not have had the chance to 
take all the possible hours, so such an analysis might confuse cause with effect. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The last two segments have slopes that do not differ statistically from zero.  Thus, the figure 
could be depicted as a slide: one upward slope, then a corner and flat area. 
Figure 4.1 Effect of Hours of General Financial Education on AMND 
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Program fixed effects.  As expected, program fixed effects are large for both regressions (Table 
4.2).  The general conclusion is that the regression is not picking up important unobserved 
characteristics that are correlated with the specific programs. 
 
Does this support the theory that institutional characteristics matter?  Probably, but it is not very 
informative, given that the characteristics that matter are unobserved.  Also, there is a possibility 
that the characteristics associated with a specific program do not have anything to do with the 
program itself, but rather are linked to the local economy or other forces common to the locality.  
This would not, however, explain the difference between the two CAPTC programs carried out 
in the same city. 
 
 
 
 
Participant Demographics 
 
This section describes associations between participant demographics and the probability of 
being a saver and the level of AMND.  These participant demographics may be best seen as 
controls rather than as causes; they are proxies for unobserved factors correlated with both 
participant demographics and savings outcomes. 
 
Gender.  Females are more likely to be savers than males, but the effect is not statistically 
significant.  Gender has no statistical link with AMND (Table 4.3). 
Independent variable Mean ∆ % pt. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Program or program/site dummies
CAAB (non-AFIA) 0.04 20 0.21 0.03 -20.7 0.10
CAPTC Small-scale 0.07 1 0.90 0.08 -9.1 0.01
MACED 0.03 -4 0.76 0.03 -8.7 0.18
WSEP (ADD/AFIA) 0.03 -41 0.01 0.02 -6.1 0.44
CVCAC (non-AFIA) 0.07 34 0.01 0.08 -5.7 0.24
Heart of America 0.04 12 0.23 0.05 -5.4 0.29
Alternatives FCU 0.04 21 0.07 0.06 -1.0 0.87
Foundation Communities 0.05 -21 0.01 0.04 -0.8 0.85
CAPTC Large-scale 0.20 0.21
Bay Area 0.10 55 0.01 0.12 2.2 0.81
CAAB (ADD/AFIA) 0.02 44 0.01 0.03 3.0 0.82
WSEP (non-AFIA) 0.06 -21 0.02 0.04 3.8 0.49
Shorebank 0.09 -6 0.34 0.07 4.0 0.29
Near Eastside 0.08 -10 0.27 0.07 6.9 0.20
CVCAC (ADD/AFIA) 0.02 0 0.99 0.03 7.9 0.18
Human Solutions 0.05 -6 0.46 0.04 10.8 0.01
ADVOCAP 0.03 -4 0.66 0.04 24.6 0.01
Probability Saver
(56%)
AMND for Savers
(Mean = $33.81)
Table 4.2  Unobserved Factors Linked with Programs
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Age.  Older people are more likely to be savers (Figure 4.2), and the effect is fairly large, though 
not quite reaching traditional levels of statistical significance (Table 4.3).  For AMND, dollars 
saved increases up to age 40, and then decreases.  These results are also close to statistical 
significance. 
 
Independent variable Mean ∆ % pt. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Gender
Male 0.20 0.21
Female 0.80 2.7 0.40 0.79 0.11 0.95
Age (spline) 36 37
0 to 40 years 33 0.22 0.29 34 0.18 0.10
40 years or more 2 0.47 0.11 3 -0.14 0.30
Location of residence
Population 2,500 or more 0.87 0.84
Population less than 2,500 0.13 -6.6 0.23 0.16 0.61 0.82
Marital status
Married 0.22 3.1 0.42 0.25 -1.8 0.35
Never-married 0.49 0.43
Widowed 0.02 6.4 0.48 0.02 0.2 0.96
Divorced or separated 0.27 1.7 0.59 0.29 0.33 0.83
Household composition 3.2 3.2
Adults (18 or older) 1.5 2.3 0.26 1.5 2.3 0.03
Children (17 or younger) 1.7 -0.47 0.61 1.7 -0.91 0.05
Race/ethnicity
Native American 0.03 -3.5 0.63 0.03 -7.8 0.03
African-American 0.47 -0.8 0.81 0.40 -5.3 0.01
Caucasian 0.37 0.42
Other 0.03 15 0.05 0.03 1.7 0.62
Asian-American 0.02 20 0.03 0.03 2.5 0.53
Hispanic 0.09 8.7 0.09 0.10 3.0 0.23
Means taken over only non-missing observations.
Probability Saver
(56%)
AMND for Savers
(Mean = $33.81)
Table 4.3  Participant Demographics
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Location of residence.  People in rural areas are much less likely to be savers (6.6 percentage 
points, Table 4.3), although statistical significance is low (77-percent confidence).  This may 
reflect the greater transaction costs in making a deposit in rural areas.  Location of residence has 
essentially no link with AMND. 
 
Marital status.  Marital status is not statistically significant in either part of the two-step 
regression (Table 4.3).   
 
Household composition.  The number of adults and the number of children has essentially no 
link with the likelihood of being a saver (Table 4.3).   
 
An additional adult in the household increases AMND by about $2.  This makes sense; more 
adults in the household typically mean more income, and so more ability to save.  Although 
IDAs are individual accounts, people operate in households.  The number of children also has a 
large, statistically significant effect on AMND.  In particular, each additional child reduces 
AMND by about $1.  Controlling for other factors, households with “more mouths to feed” may 
have a higher level of subsistence consumption and therefore greater difficulty saving. 
 
Race/ethnicity.  “Other” ethnicities and Asian Americans are the most likely to be savers.  
Hispanics are also statistically more likely to be savers than Caucasians, African Americans, and 
Native Americans.  Among these last three groups, the likelihood of being a saver is not 
statistically different. 
 
Compared to Caucasians and controlling for other factors in the regression, Native Americans 
and African Americans saved about $8 and $5 less, respectively.  “Other” ethnicities, Asian 
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Americans, and Hispanics all saved more than Caucasians, although none of the differences is 
statistically significant.  In a change since our last report, Hispanics passed Asian Americans as 
the group whose unobserved characteristics are most correlated with high AMND.  The gaps 
among Caucasians, “others”, Asian Americans, and Hispanics, however, were no larger than $3. 
 
Education and Employment 
 
Education.  Participants in every other educational category are more likely to be savers than 
high-school drop-outs (Table 4.4).  In general, the statistically significant effects are for people 
who attended at least some college, whether they graduated or not.  Those who graduated from 
college are much more likely to be savers than people who did not graduate from college.  For 
example, a 4-year college graduate is 24 percentage points more likely to be a saver than a high-
school drop-out.  Likewise, college graduates (two-year or four-year unspecified) are 17 
percentage points more likely to be savers than are high-school drop-outs.  All in all, people with 
more education, controlling for the other things in the regression, are more likely to be savers. 
 
Although education matters a lot for sticking with IDAs, it does not much affect the amount 
saved.  The only effect approaching statistical significance suggests that people who graduated 
from two-year colleges save $6 a month less than high-school drop-outs. 
 
Employment.  Although differences between the estimates associated with different 
employment categories are fairly large, only one is statistically different from the unemployed; 
students who are working are 23 percentage points more likely to be savers than are unemployed 
people (Table 4.4). 
 
Independent variable Mean ∆ % pt. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Education
Did not graduate from high school 0.16 0.12
Completed high school or earned GED 0.26 1.2 0.75 0.22 -0.05 0.98
Attended college but did not graduate 0.37 7.5 0.04 0.38 -0.88 0.69
Graduated from 2-year college 0.04 5.7 0.42 0.04 -6.0 0.10
Graduated college (2-year/4-year unspecified) 0.11 17 0.01 0.14 0.55 0.84
Graduated from 4-year college 0.07 24 0.01 0.10 2.3 0.47
Employment
Unemployed 0.05 0.04
Employed, full-time (> 35 hours per week) 0.59 4.9 0.39 0.60 2.0 0.52
Employed, part-time (< 35 hours per week) 0.23 6.5 0.26 0.23 4.1 0.20
Not working (homemakers, retired, diasabled) 0.04 3.3 0.67 0.05 -3.3 0.40
Student, not working 0.06 2.5 0.73 0.04 8.2 0.05
Student, also working 0.03 23 0.01 0.03 7.3 0.13
Employee of IDA host org.
No 0.98 0.97
Yes 0.02 0.67 0.93 0.03 8.4 0.03
AMND for Savers
(Mean = $33.81)
Probability Saver
(56%)
Table 4.4  Education and Employment Status
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The same basic pattern holds for AMND.  Students, whether working or not, save more than 
people in other employment categories. 
 
What is it about students that explain their unusual success in IDAs?  Part of the answer may be 
the large, lumpy cash inflows that they may have from loans or grants each semester.  Also the 
fact that matched withdrawals are not very far away may keep them motivated.  Or students may 
have personality traits, such as future orientation and determination, which make them more 
likely to save. 
 
From a policy perspective, students and educational accounts may be important for two reasons.  
First, students have had relative success with IDAs in ADD.  Second, educational accounts 
attract greater public and political support than other uses of IDAs. 
 
Employees of the host organization.  About 2 percent of ADD participants were also 
employees of the IDA host organization (and sometimes employees in the IDA program itself).  
The regressions show that these people are no more likely to be savers, perhaps because they 
drop-out of IDAs if they leave their position with the host organization.  Employees of the host 
organization save a greater amount, however, than the typical IDA participant (Table 4.4).  The 
effect of being an employee is about $8 per month, and it is statistically significant. 
 
 
Independent variable Mean ∆ % pt. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Receipt of public assistance
TANF or AFDC never 0.62 0.64
TANF or AFDC formerly 0.38 1.0 0.73 0.36 -0.99 0.49
TANF currently 0.10 -6.7 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.96
No SSI/SSDI 0.90 0.89
Receives SSI/SSDI 0.10 1.6 0.75 0.11 3.16 0.21
No food stamps 0.83 0.85
Receives food stamps 0.17 0.22 0.96 0.15 -2.0 0.38
Household income ($ monthly)
Total income 1,377 1,416
Recurrent income (spline) 1,150 1,150
0 to $800 663 -0.0049 0.48 654 0.0040 0.26
$801 to $1,600 362 -0.0035 0.52 361 0.0008 0.78
$1,601 or more 125 0.0015 0.76 135 0.0055 0.02
Intermittent income 227 0.0044 0.18 266 0.0054 0.01
Means taken over only non-missing observations.
AMND for Savers
(Mean = $33.81)
Probability Saver
(56%)
Table 4.5  Public Assistance and Income
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Public Assistance and Income 
 
Receipt of public assistance.  As in Schreiner et al. (2001), current or former receipt of public 
assistance is not linked to either saving outcome (Table 4.5).  Thus, there is no evidence that 
unobserved characteristics associated with receipt of public assistance are also associated with 
IDA savings performance. 
 
The link between the probability of being a saver and current receipt of TANF is negative and 
large—almost 7 percentage points—and approaching statistical significance (84-percent 
confidence).  There is, therefore, some evidence that current receipt of TANF decreases the 
likelihood of being a saver, although for savers, current receipt of TANF appears to have no 
effect. 
 
Income.  Neither the level of recurrent income nor the level of intermittent income is linked with 
the likelihood of being a saver (Table 4.5).  An increase of $100 of intermittent income increases 
the likelihood of being a saver by about half a percentage point, but the relationship is not 
significant.   
 
The level of recurrent income is not strongly linked with AMND until it exceeds $1,600 (Figure 
4.3), perhaps reflecting a subsistence constraint.  Each $100 above $1,600 increases AMND by 
about $0.55.  This is not a large effect.  The level of intermittent income has a similar effect; an 
additional $100 increases AMND by about $0.54.  These associations are statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic theory predicts that people with greater income will save more.  We find limited 
evidence of this.  Why doesn’t savings amount increase more strongly with income in ADD?  
The result may be an artifact of censoring at the match cap or of mismeasured income.  Or 
perhaps the institutional characteristics of IDAsthe match, financial education, and other 
factorsare strong enough to overshadow the predicted effect of income (Sherraden, Schreiner, 
and Beverly, forthcoming).   
Figure 4.3 Effect of the Level of Recurrent Income on AMND 
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We also find, controlling for other factors, that rate of saving is negatively associated with 
income.  In other words, the poorest participants in ADD are saving a higher proportion of their 
monthly income than less-poor participants.  Again, we do not know the extent to which this is 
due to censoring, mismeasured income, or institutional characteristics of IDAs. 
 
 
Independent variable Mean ∆ % pt. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Liquid assets
Possession of a passbook savings account
No 0.50 0.45
Yes 0.50 -6.8 0.03 0.55 -4.1 0.01
Balance in passbook savings 219 275
$1 to $700 (spline) 124 0.0443 0.01 156 0.0095 0.06
$701 to $2,200 75 -0.0201 0.02 94 -0.0033 0.41
$2,201 or more 20 -0.0031 0.85 25 0.0043 0.56
Possession of a checking account
No 0.36 0.25
Yes 0.64 13 0.01 0.75 1.0 0.61
Balance in checking 212 283
$1 to $1,500 (spline) 193 0.0132 0.01 254 0.0029 0.19
$1,501 or more 19 -0.0057 0.58 29 -0.0033 0.39
Illiquid assets
Renter 0.84 0.77
Home owner 0.16 22 0.01 0.23 4.7 0.09
No car 0.35 0.27
Car owner 0.65 7.3 0.01 0.73 2.0 0.21
Value of illiquid assets 12,811 0.00000 0.99 17,733 0.00000 0.90
Liabilities
No debt 0.32 0.30
Some debt 0.68 -5.6 0.06 0.70 -3.4 0.03
Value of liabilities 9,823 0.00020 0.99 12,893 0.00005 0.20
Insurance coverage
No health insurance 0.39 0.35
Had health insurance 0.61 8.8 0.05 0.65 2.3 0.29
No life insurance 0.60 0.58
Had life insurance 0.40 -6.4 0.15 0.42 0.70 0.74
Means taken over only non-missing observations.
Probability Saver
(56%)
AMND for Savers
(Mean = $33.81)
Table 4.6  Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance
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Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance 
 
Passbook savings.  Oddly, having a passbook savings account, in and of itself, decreases the 
likelihood of being a saver (Table 4.6) by about 7 percentage points.  On the other hand, given 
the presence of a passbook account, higher balances (at least up to $700) are linked with 
increases in the likelihood of being a saver (Figure 4.4).  Above $700, a greater balance 
decreases the likelihood of being a saver.  Above $2,200, there is essentially no effect. 
 
The association of passbook savings with AMND is similar (Table 4.6).  The presence of a 
passbook savings account is associated with a $4 reduction in AMND; yet, given the presence of 
a passbook account, increases in its balance (in the range up to $700) are linked with increases in 
AMND (Figure 4.5).  In fact, up to $700, an additional $100 in the passbook account implies an 
additional $1 of AMND.  Above $700, the effect is negative, but non-significant.   
 
What is happening?  The presence of passbook savings may signal a weak saver.  This is 
consistent with much of the research on the “unbanked”, which finds that having a passbook 
account but no checking account is almost the same as having no account at all.  Evidently the 
sophistication required to manage a checking account sets their owners apart from those with 
only passbook accounts. 
 
Given that a person has a passbook account, however, a greater balance is linked with improved 
IDA performance.  This could result from two forces.  First, people who have saved in the past 
probably will find it easier to save in the future.  Second, people with balances in their passbook 
accounts can shift the funds into their IDA accounts. 
 
Although cause-and-effect cannot be established, the regression results are consistent with a 
participant owning a passbook account shifting $12 per month into her IDA.  That this shifting 
might occur is unsurprising.  The average passbook balance is $275 (or $550 for those with 
passbook accounts).  In this sense, the “average saver” may have shifted about half of her 
passbook savings into the IDA over a period of four years. 
 
Checkbook savings.  The presence of a checkbookin contrast to the presence of a passbook 
signals an above-average probability of being a saver.  Someone with a checkbook is 13 
percentage points more likely to be a saver than is someone without a checkbook (Table 4.6).  
Furthermore, the effect of a $100 of additional checking balances is about 1.3 percentage points, 
a large effect, although it becomes statistically insignificant at a balance of about $1,500.  Figure 
4.6 shows the link between the probability of being a saver and a checkbook savings balance.  As 
usual, having a checking account not only signals some level of financial sophistication but also 
a store of assets that could be shifted. 
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Figure 4.4 Balance in Passbook Savings Account and Probability of Being a Saver 
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Possessing a checking account has no effect on AMND, but the amount in the account might.  
Up to $1,500, an additional $100 increases AMND by about $0.29, but this is not statistically 
significant (Figure 4.7).  Overall, the link between checking account and AMND is not strong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Homeownership.  Homeowners are 22 percentage points more likely to be savers than are 
renters (Table 4.6).  This is a very large and statistically significant effect.  It is even more 
Figure 4.7 Effect of Balance in Checking Account on AMND 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 600 1200 1800 2400 3000
Balance in checking account ($)
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 A
M
N
D
 
Figure 4.6 Balance in Checking Account and Probability of Being a Saver 
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striking considering that homeowners generally have mortgage payments to meet each month 
and therefore may have larger fixed demands on their incomes than do renters.   
 
Homeowners save almost $5 more a month than renters.  This is also a large and statistically 
significant effect.  It may be that homeownership causes the additional savings success, or it 
could be that the people who tend to become homeowners (due to their unobserved 
characteristics) also tend to be successful savers.  As usual, both factors are probably at work.   
 
Car ownership.  Car owners are about 7 percentage points more likely to be savers than are non-
car owners  (Table 4.6).  This effect is large and statistically significant.  Furthermore, car 
owners save about $2 more per month than non-car owners, again a large and statistically 
significant effect. 
 
Why does owning a car matter?  First, a car enables greater and better employment opportunities 
and therefore more money to save.  Second, car ownership signals some minimal ability to save 
and then maintain an asset.  Third, a car decreases the transaction costs of saving.  Not having a 
car means that making a deposit requires walking or taking the bus to the bank. 
 
A pattern seems to be evident.  People who have already saved in the past—as signaled by the 
possession of a checking account, a passbook balance, a checking balance, a home, or a car—
also tend to be more successful saving in IDAs.  Of course, this need not imply that people who 
have not already saved cannot save in IDAs—some clearly can and do—but it does suggest that 
IDA success is more likely for people who have already saved in other ways.  
 
Value of illiquid assets.  The value of illiquid assets does not appear to matter for the likelihood 
of being a saver nor for AMND (Table 4.6).  Perhaps because it is difficult to get accurate data 
on the value of a home or car, it appears that the presence of these assets matters more than their 
value. 
 
Debt.  Debt “ownership” follows a pattern very similar to car and home ownership, with the 
links reversed.  The amount of debt does not matter, not for the likelihood of being a saver nor 
for AMND.  Still, the presence of debt—which is not as likely as the value of debt to be 
measured with error—is strongly associated with both measures of IDA savings performance.  
Compared to someone with no debt, someone with debt is almost 6 percentage points less likely 
to be a saver, and the effect is statistically significant (Table 4.6).  Likewise, compared to 
someone without debt, someone with debt saves an average of about $3.40 less a month. 
 
This likely reflects consumer debt and its monthly drag on household cash flow.  This pattern is 
also interesting because most homeowners (and many car owners) also have mortgages (and car 
payments) that they must repay each month.  The effects of home debt and car debt may be 
different from the effects of other types of debt. 
 
Insurance Coverage 
 
Health insurance.  People with health insurance are almost 9 percentage points more likely to 
be savers than are people without health insurance (Table 4.6).  This is a huge, statistically 
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significant effect.  People with insurance need not self-insure by keeping a stash of ready cash 
available in case they have to go to the emergency room.  Thus, insurance allows people to save 
in (apparently) illiquid forms such as IDAs.  
 
Health-insurance coverage has a mild, positive effect ($2.30) on AMND, but the effect is not 
statistically significant (71-percent confidence). 
 
Life insurance.  The presence of life insurance has a negative association with the likelihood of 
being a saver, though the confidence level is only 85 percent (Table 4.6).  It could be that some 
poor people prefer to “save” in the form of life insurance rather than IDAs.  The presence of life 
insurance has no association with AMND. 
 
Enrollment Characteristics 
 
Previous relationship with host organization.  Participants who had a previous relationship 
with the host organization saved about as well as other participants (Table 4.7).  The coefficients 
in both steps of the regression are negative, but neither approaches conventional levels of 
statistical significance.   
 
Referred by partner organization.  Participants referred by a partner organization are about 9 
percentage points less likely to be savers (Table 4.7).  For savers, having been referred by a 
partner organization is not statistically associated with AMND. 
 
 
 
 
Enrollment after June 1999.  As the deadline for enrollment in ADD approached, some 
programs scrambled to meet enrollment goals.  In the process, they may have screened people 
less carefully, promised more than they could deliver, cut back on one-on-one help, or otherwise 
stopped doing some things that they had done with earlier enrollees.  Whatever the causal 
factors, people who enrolled late in ADD were less likely (by about 4 percentage points, 84-
percent confidence) to be savers, and those that were savers had AMND that, on average, was 
about $3 less than others (Table 4.7). 
Independent variable Mean ∆ % pt. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Previous relationship with host org.
No 0.59 0.59
Yes 0.41 -2.4 0.40 0.41 -1.4 0.30
Referred by partner organization
No 0.70 0.74
Yes 0.30 -9.2 0.01 0.26 -1.1 0.55
Date of enrollment
Before June 30, 1999 0.57
After June 30, 1999 0.43 -4.0 0.16 0.40 -2.6 0.09
AMND for Savers
(Mean = $33.81)
Probability Saver
(56%)
Table 4.7  Enrollment Characteristics
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Washington University in St. Louis 
5.  Summary and Discussion 
 
 
In this final chapter, we summarize and comment on key findings from the American Dream 
Demonstration (ADD).  We also offer some observations on IDA programs, policy, and research. 
 
The ADD Population 
 
Compared to the U.S. low-income population, ADD participants are better educated, more likely 
to be employed, and more likely to have a bank account.  This pattern reflects the explicit 
targeting of programs in ADD to the “working poor.”  Participants in ADD are also more likely 
to be female, African-American, and never-married.  This pattern reflects the populations served 
by the community-development, social-service, and housing organizations in ADD (See 
Sherraden et al., 2000 for discussion). 
 
Participants in ADD are both program-selected and self-selected.  We believe that program-
selection dominates and that even very poor people can save in IDAs.  An important policy 
question is who would enroll in IDAs if all low-income people were eligible.  Unfortunately, the 
data from ADD cannot answer this question.  Hopefully, a future study of matched saving 
accounts can test the “take up” rate for the entire population. 
 
Although IDA savings for an average eligible person are not measured, there are policy-relevant 
results from this study.  The most important results are data on the saving performance of the 
average IDA participant.  It is sometimes also informative to know the saving performance for 
savers, i.e., the more successful participants.  In this report, we present both types of results. 
 
Key Findings on Saving Performance and Asset Acquisition 
 
The Management Information System for Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA) records 
the following savings outcomes for ADD participants as of December 31, 2001: 
 
• 2,364 participants opened IDA accounts in 14 programs.   
 
• The average participant had average monthly net depositsAMNDof $19.07 ($33.81 for 
savers, those with net deposits of $100 or more).  The median was $9.83. 
 
• The average length of participation was 24.5 months. 
 
• The average participant had total net deposits of $528.   
 
• Given the average match rate of 2:1, the average participant accumulated assets in IDAs at a 
rate of about $700 per year. 
 
• On average, participants made deposits in 6 of 12 months. 
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• The average participant saved 51 cents for every dollar that could be matched. 
 
• Aggregate net deposits in ADD were $1,248,678.  Aggregate asset accumulation (net 
deposits plus match) was $3,648,149. 
 
Can the poor save in IDAs?  The ADD data show that they can.  The possibility of saving by the 
poor, even the very poor, cannot be dismissed.  IDAs may have potential to boost savings and 
asset accumulation for some poor people.   
 
Savers and Low Savers 
 
This report examines saversdefined as participants who saved a net of $100 or moreand 
low-saversdefined as participants with net deposits of $100 or less.  As of December 31, 2001, 
about 56 percent of ADD participants are savers and 44 percent are low savers.  What do these 
percentages mean?  Many of the savers are likely saving more successfully than they did in the 
past (median non-IDA passbook savings balance at the most recent data point was $2 and 
median checking balance was $50).  This is not to say that no asset shifting in IDAs occurs; 
indeed it is likely.  Regarding the low savers, we can only speculate about the effects of their 
participation in ADD.  It seems most likely that the ADD experience has affected them very 
little.  Or it could be that their lack of saving accumulation leaves them depressed and less able 
to save than before ADD.  Another possibility is that this saving and financial education 
experience is only a beginning from which they will learn and save better in the future. 
 
Data from ADD through December 31, 2001, suggest that saving is difficult for at least some of 
the poor, even in the context of the supportive institutional structure of IDAs.   
 
Saving will never be easy for poor people, and some percentage of low savers is inevitable, but 
better policy and program design may help to reduce low savers.  Recommendations include: 
 
• A policy of widespread availability.  The poor relocate more than the non-poor, and 
widespread access would ensure that the poor do not leave IDAs behind when they move. 
 
• Program designs that do not kick out participants who save low amounts or who make 
infrequent deposits.  If the goal of IDAs is long-term improvement in well-being, then it 
makes little sense to cut off access precisely to those for whom saving is most difficult.  Not 
all people can save the same amount in the same length of time, but this does not mean that 
low savers would not benefit from greater access to institutionalized savings mechanisms. 
 
• Identifying risk factors for low savers and targeting attention to at-risk participants (Schreiner 
and Sherraden, 2002). 
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Saving Performance 
 
How was saving performance in ADD?  The glass can be viewed as half-empty or half-full.  If 
half-empty, we can ask why participants did not take full advantage of their match eligibility but 
rather left about half of potential match dollars “on the table.” 
  
If half-full, we can say that half is a high rate.  As a comparison, only one-third of IRA 
contributors reach the contribution limit in each of three straight years (Bernheim, 1997).  Thus, 
many non-poor participants in subsidized-savings programs also leave dollars (in this case, tax 
benefits) “on the table.” 
 
Amount of Accumulation 
 
Are the assets accumulated in IDAs enough to make a difference?  To give perspective, median 
liquid assets (non-IDA bank accounts) for participants in ADD at the most recent data point were 
$125.  Median illiquid assets (mostly homes and cars) were $2,500, debt was $2,875, and median 
net worth was about $300.  If all net deposits were used in matched withdrawals, total asset 
accumulation would be $1,543 per participant; with only savers included, it is $2,755 per 
participant.  Thus, as a proportion of assets, IDA accumulations are very large. 
 
For the non-poor, a few hundred dollars—or even a few thousand dollars—may not seem like 
enough to make a difference.  Data on matched withdrawals in ADD, however, suggest that 
participants do use IDAs to purchase assets expected to have high returns and that mark key 
steps in the life course.  Perhaps more important, participants in qualitative components of the 
evaluation of ADD say that their asset accumulations have changed their outlooks for the better.  
Thus, what matters is not only the amount but also the existence of accumulation.   
 
Matched Withdrawals 
 
MIS IDA recorded the following results on matched withdrawals in ADD through December 31, 
2001: 
 
• About 32 percent of participants had taken a matched withdrawal. 
 
• Most participants used matched withdrawals for home purchase (28 percent), microenterprise 
(23 percent), or post-secondary education (21 percent).  All programs in ADD match these 
three uses, and some also match other uses. 
 
Among savers, intended uses are home purchase (55 percent), microenterprise (18 percent), and 
post-secondary education (14 percent).  Most ADD programs allow participants to make a 
matched withdrawal through June 30, 2002. 
 
The Dysfunction of Deadlines 
 
Unlike subsidized-savings programs for the non-poor, ADD imposes deadlines for matched 
withdrawals, beyond which participants will lose access to matches.  If the goal is to improve the 
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well-being of the poor in the long term, however, then these time limits are not desirable.  Some 
participants might be content to save without a specific purchase in mind, and it is not clear how 
they would benefit if forced to make a matchable purchase in a narrow time frame.  Limits on 
funds are the result of time limits on ADD.  A better design would allow accumulation and 
holding of funds for as long as participants wish. 
 
Some people—and some IDA staff—see IDAs as short-term savings instruments.  But this was 
never the intent; it is merely an artifact of a policy demonstration.  The policy goal should be to 
allow people to save in IDAs until they decide that they are ready to make a matched withdrawal.  
The transformation of IDAs into a short-term savings program seems unfair; for example, public 
policy for 401(k) plans does not cause people to lose access to their funds or tax benefits if they 
miss a deadline or if they suspend contributions for long periods.  This is yet another example of 
double standards in social policy, where the poor are confined to more restrictions and more 
punitive conditions than the non-poor.   
 
In fact, the need for research in ADD (and the publication of this report) is an example of this 
double standard; demonstrations and research were not required before the introduction of IRAs 
and 401(k) plans.  Without doubt, the research is valuable in helping to shape better IDA policy.  
But it is also one more hurdle to overcome before a widespread policy can be implemented.   
 
Unmatched Withdrawals  
 
The frequency and amount of unmatched withdrawals, coupled with their high cost in terms of 
lost matches, suggests that saving is difficult for at least some participants.  Through December 
31, 2001, about 64 percent of participants made an unmatched withdrawal from matchable 
balances. 
 
Changes in policy and program design might help to reduce unmatched withdrawals: 
 
• A program structure designed so unmatched withdrawals are more difficult to access, as in 
401(k) and 529 plans. 
 
• A savings account, labeled for emergencies, provided alongside the IDA.  Even if 
participants do not save more in the two accounts together than they would in an IDA alone, 
the mere existence of the second account (and its label) may help to preserve (and increase) 
IDA balances if it encourages participants to see IDAs as long-term savings. 
 
Program Characteristics and Saving Performance 
 
How were the institutional characteristics of programs associated with savings outcomes?  The 
links matter because policy can directly affect institutional structure.  Four factors are examined 
that, according to institutional theory, should affect saving performance: 
 
• Match rates in ADD range from 1:1 to 7:1.  The regression results suggest that higher match 
rates may encourage people to save and continue program participation; however, higher 
match rates have no statistically significant effect on AMND.  Endogeniety (programs setting 
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match rates based on what they think people can save; see Sherraden et al., 2000) and 
censoring (even if desired savings responds to changes in match rates, actual savings may 
change little or not at all, due to the match cap; see Schreiner, 2001a) affect these results to 
some unknown extent.   
 
• The match cap/monthly savings target averaged $42 in ADD, and AMND was 51 percent of 
the target.  An additional $10 of match cap per month increases the likelihood of being a 
saver by about 3 percentage points.  An additional $1.00 of match cap is associated with an 
increase of $0.70 in AMND.  Because ADD participants can only save up to the match cap, 
we may not observe their desired savings; thus, these results may not reflect true effects. 
 
• Direct deposit is used by 6 percent of ADD participants.  People who use direct deposit are 
more likely to be savers.  The policy implications of this result may be large, since drop-outs 
do not reap the benefits of the match but do consume IDA program resources.  
 
• Financial education is required of all participants in ADD.  On average, participants had 
attended 12 hours of general financial education.  In regression analysis, a small number of 
financial-education hours helps increase savings, but more than 8 to 10 hours has no affect.  
The findings suggest that financial education has positive effects on savings and that courses 
need not be long to take advantage of the potential benefits. 
 
In sum, many signs suggest that the institutional structure of IDAs matters for saving, perhaps 
particularly among the poorest.  We have taken some first steps to identify these institutional 
paths in theory (Beverly and Sherraden, 1999; Schreiner et al., 2001), and we present empirical 
evidence from ADD in this report and in Sherraden, Schreiner, and Beverly (forthcoming).  Both 
theoretically and empirically, however, we have only scratched the surface of an area of 
knowledge that requires greater development.  ADD may serve to spotlight the effects of 
institutions on saving, particularly among the poor, but more thought and research will be 
required if this knowledge is to inform public policy and program design.  Do the poor use IDAs 
because of the high rate of return (through the match), because of the social and psychological 
incentives and opportunities (through staff and peer support and through the message that assets 
matter even for the poor), and/or because of the opportunities to constrain choices (through 
regular savings goals and implicit penalties for unmatched withdrawals)?  Probably all of these 
institutional aspects matter, but we do not know the relative importance of each one. 
 
An institutional explanation of saving performance is particularly useful because it leads directly 
to policy implications regarding expectations, access, information, incentives, and facilitation.  
This research agenda should be expanded. 
 
Participant Characteristics and Saving Performance 
 
How were participant characteristics linked with savings outcomes in IDAs?  We ask whether 
IDAs are better suited to some people because IDAs might be targeted or universal.  The 
estimates below control for a wide range of program and participant characteristics and pertain 
not to all people eligible to enroll but rather only to people who did enroll.  The descriptive data 
below come from the most recent record in MIS IDA; to avoid issues of two-way causation, the 
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regression results use the at-enrollment record. 
 
• Gender.  About 80 percent of participants in ADD were female.  Gender is not associated 
with any savings outcomes.   
 
• Race/ethnicity.  About 47 percent of participants in ADD were African-American, 37 
percent Caucasian, 9 percent Hispanic, 3 percent Native American, 2 percent Asian-
American, and 3 percent “other.”  Asian Americans, Hispanics, and “other” ethnicities 
are most likely to be savers.  Native Americans and African Americans saved the least, 
about $8 and $5 less than Caucasians, respectively.  In a change since our last report, 
Hispanics surpassed Asian Americans as the group whose unobserved characteristics are 
most correlated with high AMND.  The differences among Caucasians, “others”, Asian 
Americans, and Hispanics, however, are no larger than $3. 
 
• Education.  About 85 percent of ADD participants completed high school, and 24 percent 
had some type of college degree.  People who attended some college are more likely to 
be savers, although education does not much affect the amount saved. 
 
• Employment.  Because many programs in ADD target the “working poor,” most 
participants are employed; 78 percent worked full-time or part-time.  Students who are 
working are more likely to be savers and have higher AMND than the unemployed.  
From a policy perspective, students and educational accounts may be important.   
 
• Receipt of public assistance.  About 51 percent of participants received some type of 
public assistance at or before enrollment.  Neither the likelihood of being a saver nor the 
level of AMND is associated with being a current or former welfare recipient. 
 
• Income.  On average, the income of participants in ADD was 116 percent of the poverty 
line (median 106 percent).  About 88 percent were below 200 percent of poverty.  Income 
was not strongly linked with being a saver or with AMND, even though economic theory 
predicts that people with greater income will save more and save at a higher rate.  Why 
do we not find this pattern in ADD?  Perhaps this result is due to censoring at the match 
cap or to mismeasured income.  Or perhaps the institutional characteristics of IDAsthe 
match, financial education, and other factorsare strong enough to overshadow the 
predicted effect of income (Sherraden, Schreiner, and Beverly, forthcoming).   
 
• Insurance coverage.  Fifty-two percent of participants in ADD had health insurance, and 
33 percent had life insurance.  Participants with health insurance are more likely to be 
savers than those without such insurance.  This may be due to the fact that people with 
health insurance need not self-insure by keeping a stash of ready cash available in case 
they are ill.  Furthermore, participants with health insurance are more likely to be 
employed and have more resources in general.  Owning life insurance is negatively 
associated with a being a saver but the result is statistically insignificant. 
 
• Asset ownership.  People who have already saved in the past—as evidenced by the 
possession of a checking account, a passbook balance, a checking balance, a home, or a 
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car—also tend to have better saving performance in IDAs.  Of course, this is not to say 
that people who have not already saved cannot save in IDAs—some clearly can and do—
but it does suggest that IDA savings outcomes are best for people who have already 
saved successfully in other forms.  
 
Who Should Save in IDAs? 
 
Some people may worry that access to IDAs would harm the poorest because, with few 
resources, saving could cause hardship.  Should IDAs be offered only to the “working poor”?   
 
Indeed, most of the IDA programs in ADD chose to target the “working poor.”  Was this a good 
choice?  Perhaps.  The “working poor” did save in IDAs.  Current receipt of public assistance, 
however, was not linked with savings outcomes.  Likewise, income was not strongly related with 
savings outcomes.  The poorest saved somewhat less than others, but they nevertheless saved a 
larger share of their income than the less-poor.  ADD suggests that, at a minimum, inclusion of 
the very poor in access to IDAs may make sense.  As far as we know, IDAs are effective even 
for people below the poverty line.  Of course, evidence from ADD pertains only to the people 
who enrolled and not to all those eligible to enroll.   
 
Race/ethnicity 
 
Results by race/ethnicity are important.  Foremost, enrollees in ADD from all groups saved in 
IDAs.  The large gaps for African Americans and Native Americans, however, are troubling.  On 
average, people in these groups hold little wealth relative to Caucasians.  IDAs in ADD did not 
make this profound inequality worse.  Indeed, if all low-income African Americans and 
Caucasians were to save in IDAs as they did in ADD, then the ratio of net worth between the 
groups would improve a lot.  Nonetheless, unequal savings outcomes for different groups 
represent lost potential for asset building, particularly for African Americans and Native 
Americans.  This persistent pattern in ADD is unacceptable.  IDA research should ask diligently 
why it occurs and, more importantly, what might be done to narrow the gaps. 
 
Toward the Future  
 
Although the MIS IDA data for ADD are suggestive in a number of areas, they are not definitive.  
We do not yet know much about how or why the poor save in IDAs, although data from the 
qualitative components of ADD have begun to shed light on these questions.  Also, these 
quantitative data do not say whether the poor save more with IDAs than they would have saved 
otherwise. 
 
The research design for ADD includes multiple methods to address questions which data from 
MIS IDA cannot answer.  In-depth interviews with participants aim to learn how they perceive 
IDAs and their advantages and disadvantages.  The goal is to learn how and why the poor save in 
IDAs, in their own words, and to tease out social and psychological effects.  Often, the 
interviews seek to understand, confirm, or disprove the quantitative results from MIS IDA data. 
 
The experimental component of ADD is designed to test the impact of IDAs on savings, asset 
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accumulation, and a wide range of social and economic outcomes through a longitudinal survey 
of people with access to IDAs and of people without access.  This social experiment is 
innovative in its focus on saving by the poor and in its use of a survey instrument crafted to 
measure “asset effects” on world views and on behaviors that go beyond financial outcomes.  
With good fortune, the experiment will shed light on these possible impacts. 
 
New policy initiatives for IDAs, children’s savings accounts, and other inclusive asset-based 
policies are becoming more common.  The most important thing we can say is that thoughtful 
and conscientious research should accompany these policy developments so that we can better 
answer questions about saving and asset accumulation by the poor.   
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Appendix A 
Research in ADD 
 
 
This appendix summarizes the progress of the multiple research methods used in ADD.   
 
ADD Research 
 
There are many important research questions related to IDAs.  In ADD, we are able to address 
some of the key questions related to inclusion in asset-based policy.  The first question, the 
“policy impact” question, is:  Do IDAs enable the poor to accumulate assets and use them to 
meet life goals?  Policy research typically stops at this point.   
 
However, two additional questions related to IDAs may in fact be more fundamental, connecting 
to existing bodies of social science knowledge.  These questions have been identified and 
specified as working propositions (Sherraden, 1999).  CSD has taken steps to summarize existing 
empirical data and toward theoretical development.  One key question is:  How can the poor 
save?  In brief, there is reason to believe that the poor save not only because of personal 
preferences, but also because of institutional factorsinformation, incentives, access, and 
facilitation (Sherraden, 1991; Beverly, 1997; Beverly and Sherraden, 1999; Sherraden, 
Schreiner, and Beverly, forthcoming). 
 
Another key question is:  What are the effects of asset holding?  In brief, asset holding has in 
addition to deferred consumption multiple and generally positive effects on individuals, families, 
and communities, (Sherraden, 1991; Page-Adams and Sherraden, 1997; Boshara, Scanlon, and 
Page-Adams, 1998; Scanlon and Page-Adams, 2001).  These last two questions, if data and 
theory continue to develop in the present direction, have the potential to alter the way saving and 
asset holding are understood and to provide an intellectual foundation for asset-based policy.  
However, a great deal more empirical and theoretical work will be necessary.  ADD research 
takes us some steps forward. 
 
Progress of ADD Research 
 
Assessment of IDA Program Implementation.  Assessment of implementation of IDA 
programs is necessary if we are to (1) ascertain whether in fact the IDA program has actually 
been implemented, to what extent, and in what form, and (2) learn what challenges and problems 
the IDA programs encounter and how those problems are resolved or not resolved.  
Implementation assessment can tell us a lot about how IDA programs get off the ground and 
about “best practices” during the early period.  Every six months for the first two years, we asked 
IDA programs to fill out an open-ended “guided narrative” that assesses many aspects of 
program implementation and administration.  After reviewing this information, we undertook 
face-to-face interviews with representatives from each of the 13 sponsoring organizations.  Four 
rounds of data collection, both guided narratives and interviews, were completed in September 
1997, March 1998, October 1998, and March 1999.  Deborah Page-Adams of the University of 
Kansas, a CSD faculty associate, has led the implementation-assessment team.  Ed Scanlon, now 
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at the University of Kansas, Freda Bady of CSD, and Lissa Johnson of CSD helped carry out the 
interviews.  A report on the first year of implementation is part of the Start-Up Evaluation 
Report (1999).  A report on the first two years of implementation is available on the CSD 
website: Design, Implementation, and Administration of Individual Development Account 
Programs (Page-Adams, 2002). 
 
Participant Case Studies.  Case studies are like in-depth interviews, but more extensive.  They 
seek richer biographies of participants and the ways in which IDAs have affected their lives.  
Furthermore, cases can be followed through time via multiple interviews.  For ADD, both 
successful and unsuccessful IDA participants were interviewed.  The purposes of the case studies 
were to inform the in-depth interview process as well as to bring detail and life to the 
quantitative data.  Margaret Sherraden of the University of Missouri and a CSD faculty associate, 
Karen Edwards and Freda Bady of CSD, and Courtney Everson and Philip Hong conducted 
multiple interviews with each of 16 participants in ADD programs in rural Vermont, 
Washington, D.C., Chicago, Kansas City, and San Francisco. These cases supplemented the 
short survey data in a CSD paper at the September 2000 Symposium on Inclusion in Asset 
Building.   
 
Cross-Sectional Survey.  Because ADD research seeks to inform the design of programs and 
policies even before ADD ends, and because experimental-design data that could show IDA 
impacts were not available, CSD conducted a cross-sectional survey of participants in some of 
the non-experimental programs.  This brief survey asked participants about IDAs, saving 
behavior, and the effects of asset accumulation.  Esther Cho of CSD, Sandy Beverly of the 
University of Kansas and a CSD faculty associate, and Michael Sherraden of CSD prepared, pre-
tested, and revised the survey instrument.  Under the direction of Lissa Johnson, it was 
administered by ADD program staff to approximately 300 IDA participants at seven IDA 
programs between July and September 1999.  Amanda Moore and Margaret Lombe entered and 
cleaned the data set, and Amanda Moore, Sandy Beverly, and others drafted the report.  This 
report was the basis of a paper at CSD’s September 2000 Symposium on Inclusion in Asset 
Building.  Following the symposium, the final report was completed (Moore et al., 2001).  Data 
from this survey have been cited in many key policy discussions, including the 2002 Report of 
the Commission to Strengthen Social Security and the 2002 Economic Report of the President.  
 
Monitoring/Management Information System (MIS IDA).  CSD created the Management 
Information System for Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA) to help manage, monitor, 
and report on IDA programs.  With the leadership, design, and programming work of Lissa 
Johnson and Jim Hinterlong (1998), MIS IDA, although born as a research tool, has become the 
backbone of IDA operations nationwide.  CSD collected June 1998 data using Version 1.0 of 
MIS IDA, and reported these results in the Start-Up Evaluation Report (Sherraden et al., 1999).  
Since then, MIS IDA has been considerably upgraded.  MIS IDA 2.0 was used to collect the June 
1999 data reported in Savings Patterns in IDA Programs (Sherraden et al., 2000).  This report 
has substantially influenced policy development.  With additional improvements, MIS IDA 3.0 
became available in January 2000, along with MIS IDA QC, quality-control software that 
enables sites to report more accurate data.  Lissa Johnson, Dan Kelley, and Margaret Clancy 
have contributed to these improvements in MIS IDA.  MIS IDA 3.0 was used to collect data as 
of June 2000, which is reported in Savings and Asset Accumulation in Individual Development 
Accounts (Schreiner et al., 2001).  MIS IDA 4.0 was released in November 2001.  Led by 
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Margaret Clancy, data was collected through December 31, 2001 for this report.  This marks the 
end of the ADD savings accumulation period.   
 
The MIS IDA data are the best data that exist on savings patterns in a subsidized savings 
program, and MIS IDA reports have been the most influential ADD research documents to date.  
These reports have been cited by the White House, the US Treasury Department, Her Majesty’s 
Treasury in the United Kingdom, and elsewhere.  The simple fact that CSD has accurate data 
demonstrating that low-income people can save in IDAs has had great policy influence.  Another 
finding is that very poor people in ADD save about as well as everyone else, and this also has 
had important policy impacts.     
 
In-Depth Interviews.  The in-depth interview instrument was designed at CSD by Margaret 
Sherraden, and it was tested with IDA participants at multiple ADD sites. We have consulted 
with Kathy Edin, a member of the Evaluation Advisory Committee, in design of this part of the 
research.  Amanda Moore, research associate at CSD, has helped with more recent refinements 
of the instrument.  In-depth interviews led by Amanda Moore in the field, began in July 2000. In-
depth interviews were completed with 62 members of the treatment group and 26 members of 
the control group.  The one-on-one interviews lasted two hours or longer, with follow-up 
interviews as necessary to fill in important information.  Spanish-speaking respondents were 
interviewed in Spanish.  All interviews are being transcribed and analyzed using qualitative-
analysis software.  A report will be available in late 2002.  The original plan was to carry out in-
depth interviews in years two and four, but CSD decided to move this component of the research 
to year three.  CSD may carry out a second wave of in-depth interviews in year five, if we have 
the resources and a sufficient “pay off” in new knowledge looks likely.  We anticipate that the 
in-depth interview report will be richly informative and influential in IDA policy discussions. 
 
Cost Analysis and Benefit-Cost Analysis.  A framework and design for benefit-cost analysis 
was completed by Mark Schreiner (2000a), specifying what program-cost information we need 
to collect in MIS IDA and in cost studies on-site and what data on participant costs and outcomes 
we need to collect in the experimental design survey.  These data are being collected during the 
demonstration, but the benefit-cost analysis and report will not take place until the fifth year of 
ADD.   
 
We had not planned to report cost data until the benefit-cost study was completed, but at the 
meeting of the Evaluation Advisory Committee in March 1999, discussion pointed to the 
importance of getting good cost data early from the programs.  As a result, CSD has augmented 
its plans for collecting cost data with visits to the experimental site in Tulsa.  In May 2000, Mark 
Schreiner completed an on-site cost assessment at the Tulsa IDA program, with excellent 
cooperation from CAPTC staff (Schreiner, 2000b).  Costs during the start-up period were, not 
unexpectedly, rather high.  Costs dropped substantially over time as reported in the next year’s 
follow-up assessment (Schreiner, 2002).  These reports have generated quite a lot of discussion 
about cost efficiencies and overall design of IDAs (Sherraden, 2000).  The cost data have caused 
a deeper consideration of how to deliver IDAs more efficiently in order to reach large scale.  
This has not always been an easy discussion for those interested in IDAs, but it is essential, and 
has led to consideration of large and efficient systems including, for example, the possibility of 
integrating IDAs with state College Savings Plans (Clancy, 2001).    
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Experiment.  The first IDA experiment has been implemented in Tulsa Oklahoma, with survey 
data from 537 participants in the treatment group and 566 people in the control group collected 
by Abt.  The questionnaire was initially developed by CSD and then revised by Abt.  Baseline 
data (Wave 1) were collected just before the random assignment of qualified applicants from 
October 1998 through fall 1999.  In Wave 2, members of the treatment and control groups were 
interviewed 18 months after assignment.  Wave 2 began in May 2000 and continued through 
August 2001.  In Wave 3, treatments and controls will be interviewed 42 months after 
assignment. 
 
Following Wave 2, both Abt and CSD were scheduled to analyze and issue research reports on 
the progress of the experiment.  Abt Associates was to address the policy question of whether 
people are saving and accumulating assets, and CSD was to address questions regarding how 
people save and the effects of asset accumulation.  These reports from the experiment have been 
delayed.  CSD’s review of Abt’s data collection identified numerous questionable data values 
(for example, inconsistent values, extraordinarily high values and impossible values).  CSD 
systematically examined the data and raised questions with the Evaluation Advisory Committee 
(EAC).  The EAC recommended that Abt go back to respondents to check and correct 
questionable values in the Wave 1 and 2 data and also recommended that Abt put better quality-
control procedures in place for the Wave 3 data.  At present, we are working with Abt to try to 
implement the EAC recommendations and improve the data.  With noisy data, it will be hard to 
learn from the experiment; we are hopeful that the experimental data will be improved. 
 
Assessment of Community Level Effects.  Although methodologies for assessing community-
level effects are not well established, it may be important to ask what effects IDAs have in the 
community, above and beyond effects on individuals and families.  A CSD team prepared a 
preliminary design and plan for a community-level study.  The design called for (1) visual 
assessment and rating of community characteristics, (2) use of social indicators such as crime, 
school attendance, and various types of community participation, and (3) interviews with key 
informants regarding community-level effects of IDAs.  Community-level research requires a 
concentration of IDAs within an identified geographical area because unless IDAs reach a 
certain concentration, one would anticipate no measurable community-level effects.  Because no 
appropriate site for this study exists within ADD, we looked to other IDA programs.   
 
The Atlanta United Way is using IDAs for homeownership as a neighborhood-revitalization 
strategy, concentrating on specific neighborhoods. CSD reached an agreement with the Atlanta 
United Way to have a community-level assessment conducted in a place where IDAs for 
homeownership are being concentrated as a neighborhood-revitalization strategy.  James 
Emshoff, a researcher at Georgia State University, led a research team that included other 
researchers with experience in community-level research from Emory University and from The 
Atlanta Project.  Support for costs came from CSD, from the Atlanta United Way, and from 
Annie E. Casey Foundation neighborhood-research funds.  A preliminary report (Phase 1) was 
released in 1999 based on initial surveys, focus groups, and neighborhood observations.  The 
final report, Atlanta Individual Development Account (IDA) Pilot Program, was completed in 
February 2002. 
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Ms. Margaret Clark, Director of the Economic Opportunity Project at the Aspen Institute and 
of the Self-employment Learning Project, award-winning study of microenterprise programs.   
 
Dr. Claudia Coulton, Director of the Center on Urban Poverty and Social Change at Case 
Western Reserve University, investigator of urban poverty and community development. 
 
Dr. Kathryn Edin, Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University, specialist in 
qualitative methods in studying low-income households, author of There’s a Whole Lot of Month 
Left at the End of the Money. 
 
Dr. John Else, Founder, Chair of the board, and Director of Consulting and Research for the 
Institute for Social and Economic Development (ISED), experienced in evaluation and 
monitoring of microenterprise and other economic-development strategies.  
 
Mr. Robert Friedman (liaison from ADD), Founder and Chair of the board of the Corporation 
for Enterprise Development, director of ADD, author of The Safety Net as Ladder. 
 
Dr. Irving Garfinkel, School of Social Work, Columbia University, researcher in poverty and 
inequality, policy innovator, and evaluator of child-support policy. 
 
Dr. Karen Holden, La Follette Institute of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin, author of 
numerous studies on household economics and gender.   
 
Dr. Laurence Kotlikoff, Department of Economics, Boston University, expert on 
intergenerational transfers, savings, and public policy, author of What Determines Savings? 
 
Dr. Robert Plotnick, Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs, University of Washington, 
author of several important studies on poverty and inequality.  
 
Dr. Salome Raheim, Director of the School of Social Work, University of Iowa, researcher on 
the Self-Employment Learning Project, and author of numerous papers on microenterprise.  
 
Dr. Marguerite Robinson, Retired from Harvard Institute for International Development, expert 
on design and evaluation of development-finance institutions and savings in poor households. 
 
Dr. Clemente Ruíz Durán, Director of the Post-Graduate Program in Political Economy, expert 
in small-scale saving and asset-based policy in Latin America and East Asia, author of more than 
a dozen books on economic development and social policy. 
 
Dr. Thomas Shapiro, Department of Sociology, Northeastern University, expert on assets and 
race, co-author of Black Wealth/White Wealth. 
 
Dr. Michael Sherraden (convenor), Director of the Center for Social Development, Washington 
University in St. Louis, author of Assets and the Poor, director of the ADD evaluation. 
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ADVOCAP, Inc. 
 
Participant Characteristics (N=82) 
 
           Gender %
Female 72
Male 28
Population 2,500 or more 85
Population les s  than 2,500 15
African-American 1
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 10
Caucas ian 80
Hispanic 5
Native American 1
Other 2
13 to 19 1
20s 28
30s 40
40s 22
50s 7
60 to 72 1
Never Married 33
Married 39
Divorced or Separated 27
W idowed 1
Miss ing 0
One Adult with Children 32
One Adult without Children 17
Two or more Adults  with Children 45
Two or more Adults  without Children 6
1 49
2 46
3 5
4 0
5 or more 0
Miss ing 0
0 23
1 27
2 16
3 15
4 10
5 or more 10
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 0
No 100
Did not Complete High School 12
Completed High School or GED 22
Attended College 29
Completed 2-year Degree 16
Completed Unspecified Degree 6
Completed 4-year Degree or more 13
Employed Full-time 57
Employed Part-time 27
Unemployed 1
Not W orking 6
Student, not W orking 5
Student, also W orking 4
Yes 11
No 89
0 to 49 11
50 to 74 15
75 to 99 20
100 to 124 18
125 to 149 11
150 to 174 10
175 to 199 2
200 to 686 13
Miss ing 0
Never 62
Formerly 38
Currently 1
Yes 16
No 84
Miss ing 0
Yes 7
No 93
Miss ing 0
Yes 70
No 27
Miss ing 4
Multiple Participants  in Household
Education
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Employment
Yes 48
No 46
Miss ing 6
Home Purchase 38
Self-employment 16
Post-secondary Education 23
Home Repair 15
Retirement 0
Job Training 9
Miss ing 0
Yes 9
No 91
Yes 2
No 98
Yes 9
No 91
Yes 74
No 26
Miss ing 0
Yes 4
No 96
Miss ing 0
Yes 10
No 90
Miss ing 0
Passbook Savings  Account 70
Checking 85
Both 63
Either 91
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Intended or Actual Use 
of Matched Withdrawals
Bank Account
Employee of Host Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Direct Depos it to IDA Account
Life-Insurance Coverage
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
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Income, Assets, and Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
% of 
Participants 
with a Source 
of Income
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 82 1,296 1,115 0 4,000 0 84 71
Government Benefits 82 121 0 0 1,600 0 21 9
Pensions 82 21 0 0 1,700 0 2 1
Investments 82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Recurrent Sources 82 1,438 1,229 0 4,000 0 90 80
Self-employment 82 89 0 0 1,400 0 11 7
Child Support 82 127 0 0 800 0 35 8
Gifts 82 4 0 0 300 0 1 0
Other Sources 82 80 0 0 3,000 0 7 4
    Intermittent Sources 82 300 0 0 3,000 0 49 20
Total Income 82 1,737 1,582 413 4,400 0 100 100
Income/Poverty 82 1.27 1.07 0.14 4.37 0
Income for Participants for ADVOCAP
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 82 370 50 0 3,000 0 0 8
Checking Account 82 222 100 0 1,500 0 85 6
    Total Liquid Assets 82 593 235 0 4,500 0 91 14
Home 82 15,917 0 0 110,000 0 28 25
Car 82 3,526 2,000 0 22,000 0 89 50
Business 82 720 0 0 20,000 0 11 4
Land or Property 82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 82 900 0 0 11,000 0 20 7
    Total Illiquid Assets 82 21,063 4,000 0 122,000 0 91 86
Total Assets 82 21,655 5,280 0 124,100 0 95 100
Total Liabilities 81 17,702 6,400 0 117,025 1
        Net Worth 81 3,196 1,325 -52,475 48,725 1
Assets of Participants for ADVOCAP
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Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 154
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 53
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $283
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 65
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 2.9
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $823
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $2,470
  Matched Withdrawals for ADVOCAP
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 80,674
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 10,274
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 16,270        
Total unmatched withdrawals (26,544)
Excess balances (2,799)           
Net deposits 51,331 102,660   153,990                       
    Matchable balances 7,695          15,389     23,084                         
    Matched withdrawals 43,635        87,271     130,906                       
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for ADVOCAP
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Liability 
Value by 
Type (%)
Home Mortgage 81 10,432 0 0 85,025 1 26 26
Car Loan 82 1,706 0 0 22,000 0 32 16
Business Loan 82 68 0 0 2,500 0 5 1
Land or Property 
Mortgage 82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 82 491 0 0 7,000 0 24 9
Household Bills 82 211 0 0 5,000 0 27 5
Medical Bills 82 429 0 0 15,000 0 38 6
Credit-card 82 1,698 155 0 53,000 0 54 20
Student Loans 82 2,577 0 0 30,000 0 29 17
    Total Liabilities 81 17,702 6,400 0 117,025 1 86 100
Total Assets 82 21,655 5,280 0 124,100 0 95
    Net Worth 81 3,196 1,325 -52,475 48,725 1
Liabilities of Participants for ADVOCAP
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Participant Characteristics (N=91) 
 
            Gender %
Female 77
Male 23
Population 2,500 or more 38
Population les s  than 2,500 62
African-American 21
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 0
Caucas ian 73
Hispanic 2
Native American 0
Other 4
13 to 19 14
20s 13
30s 31
40s 33
50s 9
60 to 72 0
Never Married 47
Married 22
Divorced or Separated 31
W idowed 0
Miss ing 0
One Adult with Children 52
One Adult without Children 14
Two or more Adults  with Children 30
Two or more Adults  without Children 4
1 66
2 32
3 2
4 0
5 or more 0
Miss ing 0
0 19
1 26
2 23
3 18
4 12
5 or more 2
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 20
No 80
Did not Complete High School 16
Completed High School or GED 15
Attended College 38
Completed 2-year Degree 0
Completed Unspecified Degree 23
Completed 4-year Degree or more 7
Employed Full-time 42
Employed Part-time 22
Unemployed 5
Not W orking 18
Student, not W orking 13
Student, also W orking 0
Yes 23
No 77
0 to 49 26
50 to 74 9
75 to 99 10
100 to 124 14
125 to 149 16
150 to 174 10
175 to 199 4
200 to 686 4
Miss ing 5
Never 69
Formerly 29
Currently 2
Yes 20
No 63
Miss ing 18
Yes 30
No 66
Miss ing 4
Yes 41
No 11
Miss ing 48
Multiple Participants  in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Yes 19
No 33
Miss ing 48
Home Purchase 45
Self-employment 16
Post-secondary Education 25
Home Repair 13
Retirement 0
Job Training 0
Miss ing 0
Yes 10
No 90
Yes 7
No 93
Yes 3
No 97
Yes 35
No 56
Miss ing 9
Yes 47
No 44
Miss ing 9
Yes 14
No 86
Miss ing 0
Passbook Savings  Account 84
Checking 77
Both 67
Either 93
Bank Account
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Employee of Hos t Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 91 851 672 0 3,329 0 67 54
Government Benefits 91 205 0 0 1,409 0 35 22
Pensions 91 20 0 0 722 0 4 3
Investments 86 0 0 0 14 5 1 0
    Recurrent Sources 86 1,111 887 0 3,329 5 92 79
Self-employment 91 159 0 0 1,950 0 22 9
Child Support 91 99 0 0 1,833 0 29 7
Gifts 91 17 0 0 480 0 5 1
Other Sources 91 101 0 0 2,076 0 16 4
    Intermittent Sources 91 377 50 0 2,976 0 57 21
Total Income 86 1,416 1,291 100 3,460 5 100 100
Income/Poverty 86 0.98 1.03 0.00 2.72 5
Income for Participants for Alternatives FCU
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 91 395 20 0 10,200 0 84 20
Checking Account 86 249 74 0 3,150 5 76 13
    Total Liquid Assets 86 663 123 0 10,740 5 93 33
Home 91 10,604 0 0 97,000 0 16 12
Car 91 2,296 1,000 0 20,000 0 75 44
Business 91 1,396 0 0 70,000 0 11 6
Land or Property 91 1,310 0 0 66,667 0 7 3
Investments 91 257 0 0 8,400 0 10 1
    Total Illiquid Assets 91 15,863 1,500 0 128,000 0 76 67
Total Assets 86 15,932 2,069 0 128,505 5 95 100
Total Liabilities 86 13,409 1,550 0 106,000 5
        Net Worth 81 3,887 267 -19,150 92,122 10
Assets of Participants for Alternatives FCU
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Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Liability 
Value by 
Type (%)
Home Mortgage 91 8,280 0 0 100,000 0 14 20
Car Loan 91 1,002 0 0 13,500 0 21 12
Business Loan 91 473 0 0 30,000 0 4 3
Land or Property Mortgage 91 308 0 0 24,000 0 2 1
Family and Friends Debt 89 887 0 0 16,000 2 30 19
Household Bills 90 213 0 0 7,000 1 22 10
Medical Bills 91 108 0 0 3,500 0 15 9
Credit-card 91 604 0 0 10,000 0 15 13
Student Loans 88 983 0 0 19,179 3 14 13
    Total Liabilities 86 13,409 1,550 0 106,000 5 65 100
Total Assets 86 15,932 2,069 0 128,505 5 95
    Net Worth 81 3,887 267 -19,150 92,122 10
Liabilities of Participants for Alternatives FCU
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 181
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 33
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $207
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 36
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 5.5
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $1,136
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $4,543
  Matched Withdrawals for Alternatives FCU
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 117,628
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 1,292
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 16,865
Total unmatched withdrawals (18,157)
Excess balances (2,271)
Net deposits 97,200 291,609          388,809                       
    Matchable balances 59,725        179,176          238,901
    Matched withdrawals 37,475 112,433          149,908
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for Alternatives FCU
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Participant Characteristics (N=239) 
 
          Gender %
Female 85
Male 15
Population 2,500 or more 100
Population les s  than 2,500 0
African-American 41
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 7
Caucas ian 20
Hispanic 22
Native American 2
Other 8
13 to 19 5
20s 21
30s 36
40s 29
50s 9
60 to 72 1
Never Married 69
Married 16
Divorced or Separated 13
W idowed 1
Miss ing 0
One Adult with Children 29
One Adult without Children 21
Two or more Adults  with Children 33
Two or more Adults  without Children 16
1 50
2 35
3 9
4 5
5 or more 1
Miss ing 0
0 37
1 28
2 18
3 10
4 3
5 or more 3
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital S tatus
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 7
No 93
Did not Complete High School 15
Completed High School or GED 17
Attended College 45
Completed 2-year Degree 0
Completed Unspecified Degree 15
Completed 4-year Degree or more 8
Employed Full-time 48
Employed Part-time 22
Unemployed 17
Not W orking 8
Student, not W orking 5
Student, also W orking 0
Yes 26
No 74
0 to 49 27
50 to 74 12
75 to 99 10
100 to 124 10
125 to 149 7
150 to 174 8
175 to 199 8
200 to 686 16
Miss ing 0
Never 68
Formerly 32
Currently 15
Yes 14
No 86
Miss ing 0
Yes 7
No 93
Miss ing 0
Yes 36
No 24
Miss ing 40
Multiple Participants  in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Yes 15
No 44
Miss ing 41
Home Purchase 31
Self-employment 36
Post-secondary Education 26
Home Repair 0
Retirement 2
Job Training 4
Miss ing 1
Yes 0
No 100
Yes 0
No 100
Yes 3
No 97
Yes 16
No 84
Miss ing 0
Yes 0
No 0
Miss ing 100
Yes 3
No 97
Miss ing 0
Passbook Savings  Account 54
Checking 70
Both 43
Either 81
Bank Account
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Employee of Hos t Organization
Previous  Relationship
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 239 862 600 0 3,600 0 62 54
Government Benefits 239 130 0 0 1,138 0 24 16
Pensions 239 3 0 0 370 0 1 0
Investments 239 2 0 0 203 0 2 0
    Recurrent Sources 239 997 800 0 3,600 0 79 71
Self-employment 239 190 0 0 2,000 0 22 15
Child Support 239 34 0 0 927 0 8 3
Gifts 239 19 0 0 2,000 0 3 1
Other Sources 238 107 0 0 3,000 1 15 10
    Intermittent Sources 238 350 0 0 3,000 1 41 29
Total Income 238 1,349 1,200 0 3,657 1 99 100
Income/Poverty 238 1.12 1.01 0.00 3.92 1
Income for Participants for Bay Area
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 238 420 15 0 5,000 1 54 20
Checking Account 239 270 100 0 3,000 0 70 26
    Total Liquid Assets 238 691 250 0 5,200 1 81 46
Home 239 6,052 0 0 290,000 0 4 5
Car 233 2,094 300 0 26,000 6 51 36
Business 239 760 0 0 35,000 0 13 9
Land or Property 239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 239 253 0 0 10,000 0 10 4
    Total Illiquid Assets 233 9,329 900 0 290,415 6 60 54
Total Assets 232 9,985 1,450 0 290,435 7 90 100
Total Liabilities 237 9,795 1,350 0 185,415 2
        Net Worth 230 -568 0 -69,800 105,020 9
Assets of Participants for Bay Area
70   Final Report on Saving Performance in ADD 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
 
 
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches 
 
 
 
 
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 240
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 120
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $346
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 50
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 2.0
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $691
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $2,403
  Matched Withdrawals for Bay Area
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 294,003
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 70,737
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 103,553
Total unmatched withdrawals (174,290)
Excess balances (5,946)
Net deposits 113,766 266,392            380,158                       
    Matchable balances 30,828          60,990              91,818
    Matched withdrawals 82,938 205,402            288,340
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for Bay Area
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 238 3,403 0 0 185,000 1 3 4
Car Loan 239 942 0 0 25,000 0 10 8
Business Loan 239 231 0 0 25,000 0 3 2
Land or Property Mortgage 239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 239 522 0 0 20,000 0 23 12
Household Bills 239 169 0 0 7,500 0 18 9
Medical Bills 239 107 0 0 8,000 0 11 6
Credit-card 238 2,087 250 0 60,000 1 52 43
Student Loans 239 2,275 0 0 75,000 0 20 18
    Total Liabilities 237 9,795 1,350 0 185,415 2 75 100
Total Assets 232 9,985 1,450 0 290,435 7 90
    Net Worth 230 -568 0 -69,800 105,020 9
Liabilities of Participants for Bay Area
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Participant Characteristics (N=142) 
 
           Gender %
Female 79
Male 21
Population 2,500 or more 100
Population les s  than 2,500 0
African-American 87
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 1
Caucas ian 1
Hispanic 9
Native American 0
Other 1
13 to 19 11
20s 23
30s 39
40s 17
50s 8
60 to 72 1
Never Married 66
Married 13
Divorced or Separated 17
W idowed 3
Miss ing 1
One Adult with Children 52
One Adult without Children 15
Two or more Adults  with Children 27
Two or more Adults  without Children 5
1 67
2 27
3 4
4 0
5 or more 1
Miss ing 1
0 20
1 30
2 23
3 18
4 4
5 or more 6
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 6
No 94
Did not Complete High School 21
Completed High School or GED 40
Attended College 31
Completed 2-year Degree 0
Completed Unspecified Degree 6
Completed 4-year Degree or more 1
Employed Full-time 71
Employed Part-time 13
Unemployed 1
Not W orking 2
Student, not W orking 12
Student, also W orking 1
Yes 0
No 100
0 to 49 8
50 to 74 7
75 to 99 18
100 to 124 13
125 to 149 15
150 to 174 10
175 to 199 10
200 to 686 19
Miss ing 0
Never 70
Formerly 30
Currently 4
Yes 6
No 68
Miss ing 25
Yes 3
No 73
Miss ing 25
Yes 69
No 8
Miss ing 23
Multiple Participants  in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Yes 29
No 46
Miss ing 25
Home Purchase 77
Self-employment 1
Post-secondary Education 20
Home Repair 0
Retirement 0
Job Training 1
Miss ing 0
Yes 0
No 100
Yes 0
No 100
Yes 4
No 96
Yes 49
No 36
Miss ing 15
Yes 0
No 0
Miss ing 100
Yes 4
No 74
Miss ing 23
Passbook Savings  Account 63
Checking 61
Both 44
Either 79
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Bank Account
Employee of Host Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Direct Depos it to IDA Account
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 142 1,542 1,561 0 3,717 0 96 93
Government Benefits 142 22 0 0 917 0 5 3
Pensions 142 9 0 0 858 0 1 1
Investments 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Recurrent Sources 142 1,574 1,582 0 3,717 0 99 97
Self-employment 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Child Support 142 6 0 0 589 0 1 1
Gifts 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Sources 142 21 0 0 1,200 0 4 2
    Intermittent Sources 142 27 0 0 1,200 0 6 3
Total Income 142 1,600 1,583 300 3,717 0 100 100
Income/Poverty 142 1.43 1.35 0.00 3.74 0
Income for Participants for CAAB
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 139 244 50 0 3,500 3 62 31
Checking Account 135 225 50 0 2,500 7 59 31
    Total Liquid Assets 134 479 300 0 6,000 8 78 62
Home 142 750 0 0 56,500 0 1 2
Car 141 2,364 0 0 28,000 1 34 33
Business 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land or Property 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 142 258 0 0 23,553 0 5 3
    Total Illiquid Assets 141 3,379 0 0 56,500 1 38 38
Total Assets 133 3,966 530 0 57,075 9 83 100
Total Liabilities 141 2,539 0 0 59,050 1
        Net Worth 132 1,437 400 -24,043 27,850 10
Assets of Participants for CAAB
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Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 105,682
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 5,156
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 25,737
Total unmatched withdrawals (30,893)
Excess balances (9,085)           
Net deposits 65,703 210,224        275,927                       
    Matchable balances 38,405          119,598        158,003
    Matched withdrawals 27,298          90,626          117,924                       
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for CAAB
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 33
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 29
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $827
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 20
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 1.1
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $941
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $4,066
  Matched Withdrawals for CAAB
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 142 741 0 0 55,200 0 1 3
Car Loan 142 832 0 0 25,000 0 11 21
Business Loan 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land or Property 
Mortgage 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 142 98 0 0 9,000 0 6 7
Household Bills 142 36 0 0 1,000 0 13 20
Medical Bills 141 11 0 0 1,400 1 1 2
Credit-card 142 670 0 0 23,593 0 24 42
Student Loans 141 181 0 0 10,000 1 3 5
    Total Liabilities 141 2,539 0 0 59,050 1 43 100
Total Assets 133 3,966 530 0 57,075 9 83
    Net Worth 132 1,437 400 -24,043 27,850 10
Liabilities of Participants for CAAB
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Participant Characteristics (N=154) 
 
           Gender %
Female 80
Male 20
Population 2,500 or more 26
Population les s  than 2,500 74
African-American 2
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 0
Caucas ian 88
Hispanic 1
Native American 5
Other 4
13 to 19 5
20s 18
30s 39
40s 31
50s 5
60 to 72 2
Never Married 41
Married 21
Divorced or Separated 36
W idowed 1
Miss ing 1
One Adult with Children 43
One Adult without Children 14
Two or more Adults  with Children 31
Two or more Adults  without Children 10
1 57
2 36
3 5
4 1
5 or more 0
Miss ing 1
0 25
1 30
2 29
3 9
4 5
5 or more 3
Res idence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital S tatus
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 21
No 79
Did not Complete High School 9
Completed High School or GED 18
Attended College 31
Completed 2-year Degree 2
Completed Unspecified Degree 22
Completed 4-year Degree or more 17
Employed Full-time 41
Employed Part-time 50
Unemployed 4
Not W orking 1
Student, not W orking 2
Student, also W orking 3
Yes 43
No 57
0 to 49 36
50 to 74 17
75 to 99 15
100 to 124 12
125 to 149 6
150 to 174 5
175 to 199 3
200 to 686 3
Miss ing 3
Never 50
Formerly 42
Currently 27
Yes 30
No 39
Miss ing 31
Yes 13
No 59
Miss ing 28
Yes 47
No 8
Miss ing 44
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Multiple Participants  in Household
Education
Yes 13
No 43
Miss ing 44
Home Purchase 43
Self-employment 32
Post-secondary Education 17
Home Repair 6
Retirement 0
Job Training 3
Miss ing 0
Yes 3
No 97
Yes 8
No 92
Yes 1
No 99
Yes 48
No 25
Miss ing 27
Yes 21
No 51
Miss ing 28
Yes 4
No 56
Miss ing 40
Passbook Savings  Account 56
Checking 74
Both 42
Either 89
Bank Account
Employee of Host Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Direct Depos it to IDA Account
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an 
Income Source 
(%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 154 571 383 0 2,500 0 71 47
Government Benefits 154 229 0 0 1,670 0 44 26
Pensions 154 15 0 0 788 0 2 1
Investments 150 0 0 0 10 4 1 0
    Recurrent Sources 150 814 736 0 2,554 4 87 74
Self-employment 154 165 0 0 2,000 0 39 14
Child Support 154 75 0 0 915 0 29 8
Gifts 154 8 0 0 500 0 5 1
Other Sources 154 38 0 0 1,200 0 16 3
    Intermittent Sources 154 287 75 0 2,245 0 58 26
Total Income 150 1,107 1,000 50 2,554 4 100 100
Income/Poverty 150 0.76 0.70 0.00 2.87 4
Income for Participants for CVCAC
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 147 322 5 0 7,000 7 54 10
Checking Account 148 189 50 0 2,200 6 73 10
    Total Liquid Assets 143 519 113 0 7,300 11 88 20
Home 153 18,280 0 0 157,800 1 27 25
Car 149 2,668 1,500 0 26,000 5 79 46
Business 154 706 0 0 30,000 0 21 6
Land or Property 152 1,907 0 0 180,000 2 3 2
Investments 154 338 0 0 20,000 0 6 1
    Total Illiquid Assets 146 23,391 2,500 0 254,750 8 80 80
Total Assets 136 25,372 2,786 0 259,750 18 92 100
Total Liabilities 148 17,719 3,100 0 231,700 6
        Net Worth 132 7,703 808 -99,350 259,750 22
Assets of Participants for CVCAC
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Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Liability 
Value by 
Type (%)
Home Mortgage 154 10,408 0 0 130,000 0 21 25
Car Loan 153 1,465 0 0 18,500 1 25 22
Business Loan 153 750 0 0 83,000 1 5 3
Land or Property Mortgage 154 432 0 0 35,000 0 2 1
Family and Friends Debt 152 1,479 0 0 120,000 2 22 11
Household Bills 152 319 0 0 24,500 2 32 11
Medical Bills 153 60 0 0 4,760 1 11 2
Credit-card 152 643 0 0 15,000 2 24 12
Student Loans 152 2,210 0 0 80,000 2 14 12
    Total Liabilities 148 17,719 3,100 0 231,700 6 75 100
Total Assets 136 25,372 2,786 0 259,750 18 92
    Net Worth 132 7,703 808 -99,350 259,750 22
Liabilities of Participants for CVCAC
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 108
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 55
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $419
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 36
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 2.0
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $822
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $2,213
  Matched Withdrawals for CVCAC
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 121,861
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 4,863
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 9,196
Total unmatched withdrawals (14,059)
Excess balances (3,766)           
Net deposits 104,036 179,273     283,308                       
    Matchable balances 58,836         102,739     161,575
    Matched withdrawals 45,199         76,534       121,733                       
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for CVCAC
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Participant Characteristics (N=163) 
 
            Gender %
Female 77
Male 23
Population 2,500 or more 96
Population les s  than 2,500 4
African-American 44
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 1
Caucas ian 44
Hispanic 1
Native American 7
Other 2
13 to 19 0
20s 23
30s 37
40s 32
50s 6
60 to 72 3
Never Married 30
Married 36
Divorced or Separated 32
W idowed 2
Miss ing 0
One Adult with Children 45
One Adult without Children 8
Two or more Adults  with Children 38
Two or more Adults  without Children 7
1 55
2 39
3 6
4 1
5 or more 0
Miss ing 0
0 15
1 24
2 26
3 17
4 9
5 or more 7
Res idence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital S tatus
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 0
No 100
Did not Complete High School 10
Completed High School or GED 22
Attended College 35
Completed 2-year Degree 13
Completed Unspecified Degree 3
Completed 4-year Degree or more 17
Employed Full-time 82
Employed Part-time 7
Unemployed 4
Not W orking 1
Student, not W orking 1
Student, also W orking 6
Yes 20
No 80
0 to 49 9
50 to 74 10
75 to 99 18
100 to 124 17
125 to 149 17
150 to 174 10
175 to 199 4
200 to 686 17
Miss ing 1
Never 58
Formerly 42
Currently 1
Yes 9
No 91
Miss ing 0
Yes 9
No 91
Miss ing 0
Yes 53
No 26
Miss ing 21
Multiple Participants  in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Yes 49
No 30
Miss ing 21
Home Purchase 38
Self-employment 4
Post-secondary Education 7
Home Repair 30
Retirement 20
Job Training 0
Miss ing 0
Yes 19
No 81
Yes 10
No 90
Yes 2
No 98
Yes 41
No 59
Miss ing 0
Yes 15
No 85
Miss ing 0
Yes 10
No 90
Miss ing 0
Passbook Savings  Account 49
Checking 74
Both 42
Either 81
Bank Account
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Employee of Hos t Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 163 1,380 1,300 0 5,098 0 86 77
Government Benefits 163 92 0 0 1,400 0 20 7
Pensions 163 3 0 0 446 0 1 0
Investments 162 10 0 0 625 1 2 0
    Recurrent Sources 162 1,488 1,400 0 5,098 1 90 84
Self-employment 163 247 0 0 4,965 0 20 13
Child Support 163 38 0 0 600 0 17 3
Gifts 163 6 0 0 500 0 2 0
Other Sources 163 1 0 0 114 0 1 0
    Intermittent Sources 163 292 0 0 4,965 0 34 16
Total Income 162 1,782 1,585 0 5,098 1 99 100
Income/Poverty 162 1.34 1.20 0.00 4.92 1
Income for Participants for CAPTC Small-scale
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 163 200 0 0 5,200 0 49 2
Checking Account 163 314 50 0 5,000 0 74 6
    Total Liquid Assets 163 514 105 0 6,500 0 81 8
Home 162 24,102 0 0 145,000 1 48 44
Car 156 5,149 3,000 0 32,000 7 88 41
Business 163 1,729 0 0 88,096 0 11 4
Land or Property 163 9 0 0 1,500 0 1 0
Investments 163 608 0 0 22,000 0 20 4
    Total Illiquid Assets 155 32,582 22,497 0 265,096 8 91 92
Total Assets 155 33,123 22,547 0 270,096 8 95 100
Total Liabilities 155 22,949 8,200 0 157,000 8
        Net Worth 154 9,621 2,463 -97,640 113,096 9
Assets of Participants for CAPTC Small-scale
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Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Liability 
Value by 
Type (%)
Home Mortgage 163 16,671 0 0 138,000 0 40 42
Car Loan 156 3,088 0 0 25,000 7 43 23
Business Loan 162 2 0 0 300 1 1 0
Land or Property 
Mortgage 163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 163 600 0 0 35,520 0 21 6
Household Bills 163 145 0 0 4,000 0 26 7
Medical Bills 163 531 0 0 10,000 0 34 11
Credit-card 163 251 0 0 10,000 0 20 6
Student Loans 163 1,178 0 0 90,000 0 11 5
    Total Liabilities 155 22,949 8,200 0 157,000 8 86 100
Total Assets 155 33,123 22,547 0 270,096 8 95
    Net Worth 154 9,621 2,463 -97,640 113,096 9
Liabilities of Participants for CAPTC Small-scale
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 298
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 80
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $412
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 49
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 3.7
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $1,535
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $3,648
  Matched Withdrawals for CAPTC Small-scale
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 390,564
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 106,436
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 102,998
Total unmatched withdrawals (209,434)
Excess balances (19,093)
Net deposits 162,037 226,802    388,839                       
    Matchable balances 39,215          57,755      96,970
    Matched withdrawals 122,822 169,047    291,869
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for CAPTC Small-scale
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Participant Characteristics (N=470) 
 
              Gender %
Female 77
Male 23
Population 2,500 or more 96
Population les s  than 2,500 4
African-American 44
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 1
Caucas ian 45
Hispanic 2
Native American 6
Other 2
13 to 19 1
20s 30
30s 33
40s 25
50s 7
60 to 72 3
Never Married 41
Married 24
Divorced or Separated 32
W idowed 3
Miss ing 0
One Adult with Children 47
One Adult without Children 14
Two or more Adults  with Children 29
Two or more Adults  without Children 10
1 61
2 33
3 4
4 1
5 or more 0
Miss ing 0
0 24
1 21
2 30
3 15
4 8
5 or more 3
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital S tatus
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 1
No 99
Did not Complete High School 9
Completed High School or GED 19
Attended College 43
Completed 2-year Degree 14
Completed Unspecified Degree 0
Completed 4-year Degree or more 14
Employed Full-time 67
Employed Part-time 17
Unemployed 7
Not W orking 1
Student, not W orking 1
Student, also W orking 7
Yes 14
No 86
0 to 49 14
50 to 74 10
75 to 99 15
100 to 124 15
125 to 149 14
150 to 174 7
175 to 199 4
200 to 686 18
Miss ing 3
Never 67
Formerly 33
Currently 3
Yes 16
No 84
Miss ing 0
Yes 6
No 94
Miss ing 0
Yes 51
No 41
Miss ing 8
Multiple Participants  in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Yes 44
No 48
Miss ing 8
Home Purchase 58
Self-employment 5
Post-secondary Education 7
Home Repair 16
Retirement 13
Job Training 0
Miss ing 0
Yes 3
No 97
Yes 5
No 95
Yes 1
No 99
Yes 31
No 69
Miss ing 0
Yes 16
No 84
Miss ing 0
Yes 9
No 91
Miss ing 0
Passbook Savings  Account 51
Checking 74
Both 41
Either 84
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
Direct Depos it to IDA Account
Bank Account
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Employee of Host Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 470 1,276 1,200 0 6,260 0 86 74
Government Benefits 470 122 0 0 3,400 0 24 10
Pensions 470 15 0 0 1,500 0 2 1
Investments 455 15 0 0 5,000 15 1 0
    Recurrent Sources 455 1,432 1,300 0 6,760 15 93 85
Self-employment 470 129 0 0 4,020 0 13 7
Child Support 470 67 0 0 1,400 0 19 5
Gifts 470 30 0 0 2,000 0 11 2
Other Sources 470 23 0 0 3,514 0 4 1
    Intermittent Sources 470 249 0 0 4,272 0 41 15
Total Income 455 1,672 1,475 0 6,760 15 99 100
Income/Poverty 455 1.31 1.13 0.00 7.21 15
Income for Participants for CAPTC Large-scale
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 470 302 5 0 11,000 0 51 7
Checking Account 468 357 100 0 32,000 2 74 12
    Total Liquid Assets 468 660 175 0 32,005 2 84 19
Home 470 14,782 0 0 200,000 0 27 23
Car 470 4,381 2,500 0 30,000 0 79 49
Business 470 1,212 0 0 280,000 0 7 2
Land or Property 470 1,490 0 0 150,000 0 3 1
Investments 470 999 0 0 78,000 0 24 6
    Total Illiquid Assets 470 22,865 5,000 0 426,000 0 83 81
Total Assets 468 23,606 5,592 0 427,000 2 94 100
Total Liabilities 449 16,483 6,000 0 137,481 21
        Net Worth 447 7,301 1,120 -82,829 349,000 23
Assets of Participants for CAPTC Large-scale
82   Final Report on Saving Performance in ADD 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
 
 
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches 
 
 
 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Liability 
Value by 
Type (%)
Home Mortgage 470 9,228 0 0 130,000 0 21 22
Car Loan 469 2,272 0 0 29,000 1 35 22
Business Loan 470 41 0 0 12,000 0 1 0
Land or Property Mortgage 470 513 0 0 90,000 0 1 1
Family and Friends Debt 470 384 0 0 15,000 0 24 6
Household Bills 466 119 0 0 5,168 4 28 5
Medical Bills 470 788 0 0 50,000 0 38 16
Credit-card 450 779 0 0 45,000 20 32 12
Student Loans 470 2,257 0 0 88,000 0 21 15
    Total Liabilities 449 16,483 6,000 0 137,481 21 85 100
Total Assets 468 23,606 5,592 0 427,000 2 94
    Net Worth 447 7,301 1,120 -82,829 349,000 23
Liabilities of Participants for CAPTC Large-scale
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 276
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 123
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $493
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 26
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 2.2
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $1,106
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $2,586
  Matched Withdrawals for CAPTC Large-scale
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 579,173
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 80,790
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 181,849
Total unmatched withdrawals (262,639)
Excess balances (19,695)
Net deposits 296,840 432,730       729,570                       
    Matchable balances 160,761        250,731       411,492
    Matched withdrawals 136,079 181,999       318,078
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for CAPTC Large-scale
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Participant Characteristics (N=125) 
 
          Gender %
Female 66
Male 34
Population 2,500 or more 100
Population les s  than 2,500 0
African-American 18
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 1
Caucas ian 30
Hispanic 48
Native American 0
Other 3
13 to 19 5
20s 32
30s 41
40s 14
50s 7
60 to 72 1
Never Married 35
Married 33
Divorced or Separated 30
W idowed 2
Miss ing 0
One Adult with Children 38
One Adult without Children 19
Two or more Adults  with Children 30
Two or more Adults  without Children 13
1 57
2 39
3 2
4 2
5 or more 0
Miss ing 0
0 32
1 22
2 32
3 10
4 3
5 or more 1
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 11
No 89
Did not Complete High School 22
Completed High School or GED 28
Attended College 31
Completed 2-year Degree 0
Completed Unspecified Degree 14
Completed 4-year Degree or more 6
Employed Full-time 64
Employed Part-time 14
Unemployed 3
Not W orking 6
Student, not W orking 4
Student, also W orking 9
Yes 2
No 98
0 to 49 6
50 to 74 3
75 to 99 16
100 to 124 15
125 to 149 15
150 to 174 17
175 to 199 14
200 to 686 14
Miss ing 0
Never 95
Formerly 5
Currently 0
Yes 10
No 83
Miss ing 6
Yes 7
No 93
Miss ing 0
Yes 32
No 22
Miss ing 46
Multiple Participants  in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Yes 24
No 30
Miss ing 46
Home Purchase 56
Self-employment 10
Post-secondary Education 34
Home Repair 0
Retirement 0
Job Training 0
Miss ing 0
Yes 2
No 98
Yes 2
No 98
Yes 1
No 99
Yes 89
No 11
Miss ing 0
Yes 11
No 89
Miss ing 0
Yes 2
No 98
Miss ing 0
Passbook Savings  Account 39
Checking 67
Both 31
Either 75
Bank Account
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Employee of Hos t Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an 
Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 125 1,456 1,500 0 3,134 0 94 88
Government Benefits 125 58 0 0 1,175 0 13 6
Pensions 125 16 0 0 1,401 0 2 1
Investments 125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Recurrent Sources 125 1,529 1,500 0 3,134 0 98 96
Self-employment 125 26 0 0 2,300 0 2 1
Child Support 125 42 0 0 500 0 13 3
Gifts 125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Sources 125 1 0 0 100 0 1 0
    Intermittent Sources 125 70 0 0 2,300 0 15 4
Total Income 125 1,599 1,600 250 3,134 0 100 100
Income/Poverty 125 1.39 1.42 0.00 2.87 0
Income for Participants for Foundation Communities
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an 
Asset Type 
(%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 124 198 0 0 3,500 1 39 9
Checking Account 125 306 40 0 7,000 0 67 17
    Total Liquid Assets 124 506 100 0 7,000 1 75 26
Home 125 472 0 0 59,000 0 1 1
Car 124 4,781 2,000 0 25,000 1 72 72
Business 125 122 0 0 15,000 0 2 1
Land or Property 125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 125 54 0 0 3,000 0 4 1
    Total Illiquid Assets 124 5,435 2,250 0 72,000 1 72 74
Total Assets 124 5,941 3,000 0 72,300 1 86 100
Total Liabilities 124 7,315 1,100 0 109,000 1
        Net Worth 124 -1,374 75 -103,410 14,550 1
Assets of Participants for Foundation Communities
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Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Liability 
Value by 
Type (%)
Home Mortgage 125 472 0 0 59,000 0 1 1
Car Loan 124 2,594 0 0 15,000 1 32 37
Business Loan 125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land or Property Mortgage 125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 125 278 0 0 5,000 0 19 10
Household Bills 125 61 0 0 2,000 0 17 5
Medical Bills 125 512 0 0 40,000 0 13 8
Credit-card 125 1,026 0 0 20,000 0 37 31
Student Loans 125 2,335 0 0 109,000 0 9 8
    Total Liabilities 124 7,315 1,100 0 109,000 1 66 100
Total Assets 124 5,941 3,000 0 72,300 1 86
    Net Worth 124 -1,374 75 -103,410 14,550 1
Liabilities of Participants for Foundation Communities
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 45
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 23
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $596
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 18
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 2.0
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $1,165
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $3,538
  Matched Withdrawals for Foundation Communities
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 162,966
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 22,041
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 44,067
Total unmatched withdrawals (66,108)
Excess balances (13,575)
Net deposits 83,284 167,534        250,818                       
    Matchable balances 56,482            112,964        169,446
    Matched withdrawals 26,802 54,570          81,372
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for Foundation Communities
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Participant Characteristics (N=91) 
 
           Gender %
Female 86
Male 14
Population 2,500 or more 100
Population les s  than 2,500 0
African-American 37
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 2
Caucas ian 14
Hispanic 42
Native American 1
Other 3
13 to 19 0
20s 24
30s 46
40s 20
50s 7
60 to 72 3
Never Married 31
Married 29
Divorced or Separated 36
W idowed 4
Miss ing 0
One Adult with Children 37
One Adult without Children 9
Two or more Adults  with Children 45
Two or more Adults  without Children 8
1 46
2 38
3 10
4 1
5 or more 4
Miss ing 0
0 16
1 31
2 25
3 10
4 11
5 or more 5
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital S tatus
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 4
No 96
Did not Complete High School 9
Completed High School or GED 22
Attended College 40
Completed 2-year Degree 12
Completed Unspecified Degree 3
Completed 4-year Degree or more 14
Employed Full-time 55
Employed Part-time 20
Unemployed 5
Not W orking 10
Student, not W orking 4
Student, also W orking 5
Yes 21
No 79
0 to 49 22
50 to 74 13
75 to 99 18
100 to 124 5
125 to 149 7
150 to 174 13
175 to 199 5
200 to 686 10
Miss ing 7
Never 60
Formerly 40
Currently 8
Yes 11
No 69
Miss ing 20
Yes 18
No 63
Miss ing 20
Yes 54
No 25
Miss ing 21
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Multiple Participants  in Household
Yes 40
No 38
Miss ing 22
Home Purchase 37
Self-employment 12
Post-secondary Education 21
Home Repair 10
Retirement 19
Job Training 1
Miss ing 0
Yes 8
No 92
Yes 14
No 86
Yes 2
No 98
Yes 23
No 49
Miss ing 27
Yes 8
No 65
Miss ing 27
Yes 5
No 84
Miss ing 11
Passbook Savings  Account 44
Checking 76
Both 36
Either 84
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
Bank Account
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Employee of Hos t Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an 
Income Source 
(%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 91 1,000 900 0 5,000 0 75 60
Government Benefits 91 195 0 0 1,304 0 33 19
Pensions 91 25 0 0 990 0 4 2
Investments 85 2 0 0 212 6 1 0
    Recurrent Sources 85 1,177 1,133 0 3,000 6 91 80
Self-employment 91 157 0 0 2,000 0 15 7
Child Support 91 24 0 0 700 0 10 2
Gifts 91 5 0 0 375 0 2 0
Other Sources 91 266 0 0 3,200 0 20 10
    Intermittent Sources 91 453 0 0 3,620 0 41 20
Total Income 85 1,523 1,270 0 5,160 6 99 100
Income/Poverty 85 1.08 0.90 0.00 5.50 6
Income for Participants for Heart of America
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 91 363 0 0 5,000 0 44 5
Checking Account 89 624 100 0 10,000 2 75 8
    Total Liquid Assets 89 984 121 0 10,700 2 83 13
Home 91 21,951 0 0 210,000 0 33 28
Car 91 5,017 2,500 0 23,000 0 80 45
Business 91 277 0 0 10,000 0 13 3
Land or Property 91 1,771 0 0 45,000 0 8 1
Investments 90 4,366 0 0 140,000 1 31 10
    Total Illiquid Assets 90 33,695 7,950 0 270,000 1 88 87
Total Assets 88 34,089 8,175 0 276,200 3 94 100
Total Liabilities 90 24,372 11,207 0 205,000 1
        Net Worth 87 10,096 300 -43,995 225,500 4
Assets of Participants for HAFS
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Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Liability 
Value by 
Type (%)
Home Mortgage 91 14,275 0 0 175,000 0 29 26
Car Loan 91 3,743 0 0 24,000 0 41 20
Business Loan 91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land or Property 
Mortgage 91 297 0 0 20,000 0 2 0
Family and Friends Debt 91 439 0 0 10,000 0 24 5
Household Bills 90 98 0 0 2,500 1 24 6
Medical Bills 91 1,272 0 0 43,000 0 33 10
Credit-card 91 1,755 160 0 20,000 0 52 15
Student Loans 91 2,346 0 0 30,000 0 21 16
    Total Liabilities 90 24,372 11,207 0 205,000 1 91 100
Total Assets 88 34,089 8,175 0 276,200 3 94
    Net Worth 87 10,096 300 -43,995 225,500 4
Liabilities of Participants for Heart of America
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 110
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 36
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $237
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 40
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 3.1
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $725
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $2,174
  Matched Withdrawals for Heart of America
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 76,662
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 135
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 11,326
Total unmatched withdrawals (11,461)
Excess balances (791)
Net deposits 64,411 128,821        193,232                       
    Matchable balances 38,328           76,656          114,984
    Matched withdrawals 26,083 52,165          78,248
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for Heart of America
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Participant Characteristics (N=118) 
 
           Gender %
Female 78
Male 22
Population 2,500 or more 100
Population les s  than 2,500 0
African-American 15
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 5
Caucas ian 64
Hispanic 12
Native American 2
Other 2
13 to 19 0
20s 28
30s 38
40s 27
50s 5
60 to 72 2
Never Married 35
Married 26
Divorced or Separated 37
W idowed 1
Miss ing 1
One Adult with Children 48
One Adult without Children 10
Two or more Adults  with Children 32
Two or more Adults  without Children 8
1 58
2 31
3 8
4 1
5 or more 1
Miss ing 1
0 19
1 24
2 29
3 21
4 7
5 or more 1
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital S tatus
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 3
No 97
Did not Complete High School 14
Completed High School or GED 21
Attended College 35
Completed 2-year Degree 13
Completed Unspecified Degree 6
Completed 4-year Degree or more 12
Employed Full-time 56
Employed Part-time 14
Unemployed 5
Not W orking 9
Student, not W orking 9
Student, also W orking 7
Yes 14
No 86
0 to 49 16
50 to 74 10
75 to 99 16
100 to 124 11
125 to 149 9
150 to 174 15
175 to 199 8
200 to 686 14
Miss ing 0
Never 49
Formerly 51
Currently 7
Yes 12
No 64
Miss ing 25
Yes 10
No 65
Miss ing 25
Yes 58
No 13
Miss ing 29
Multiple Participants  in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Yes 31
No 40
Miss ing 30
Home Purchase 52
Self-employment 19
Post-seconjary Education 10
Home Repair 0
Retirement 17
Job Training 3
Miss ing 0
Yes 0
No 100
Yes 5
No 95
Yes 0
No 100
Yes 11
No 63
Miss ing 26
Yes 37
No 36
Miss ing 26
Yes 7
No 69
Miss ing 25
Passbook Savings  Account 60
Checking 82
Both 53
Either 89
Bank Account
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Employee of Hos t Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an 
Income Source 
(%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 118 1,237 1,279 0 4,900 0 77 67
Government Benefits 118 127 0 0 1,050 0 25 14
Pensions 118 9 0 0 1,015 0 1 1
Investments 118 0 0 0 10 0 1 0
    Recurrent Sources 118 1,372 1,300 0 4,900 0 92 82
Self-employment 118 146 0 0 3,000 0 13 8
Child Support 118 80 0 0 1,500 0 17 4
Gifts 118 15 0 0 1,200 0 3 2
Other Sources 118 58 0 0 1,400 0 10 4
    Intermittent Sources 118 298 0 0 3,850 0 40 18
Total Income 118 1,671 1,577 50 4,900 0 100 100
Income/Poverty 118 1.25 1.17 0.00 3.82 0
Income for Participants for Mercy Corps
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 116 485 5 0 6,246 2 59 14
Checking Account 110 332 100 0 4,000 8 81 12
    Total Liquid Assets 110 844 200 0 6,900 8 88 26
Home 118 10,542 0 0 166,000 0 8 9
Car 116 4,116 1,500 0 30,000 2 76 52
Business 118 1,077 0 0 36,000 0 9 5
Land or Property 118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investments 118 1,302 0 0 50,000 0 22 7
    Total Illiquid Assets 116 17,258 2,200 0 188,375 2 80 74
Total Assets 108 18,958 3,025 0 192,375 10 94 100
Total Liabilities 117 18,777 2,000 0 272,700 1
        Net Worth 107 -660 815 -230,550 111,400 11
Assets of Participants for Mercy Corps
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Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches 
 
 
 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Liability 
Value by 
Type (%)
Home Mortgage 118 8,657 0 0 160,500 0 8 9
Car Loan 118 2,053 0 0 30,000 0 22 19
Business Loan 118 1,212 0 0 130,000 0 2 1
Land or Property 
Mortgage 118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 118 331 0 0 7,000 0 22 9
Household Bills 118 148 0 0 5,000 0 26 14
Medical Bills 117 396 0 0 30,000 1 26 10
Credit-card 118 881 0 0 12,000 0 42 17
Student Loans 118 4,946 0 0 140,000 0 25 20
    Total Liabilities 117 18,777 2,000 0 272,700 1 81 100
Total Assets 108 18,958 3,025 0 192,375 10 94
    Net Worth 107 -660 815 -230,550 111,400 11
Liabilities of Participants for Mercy Corps
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 44
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 37
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $800
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 31
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 1.2
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $952
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $1,904
  Matched Withdrawals for Mercy Corps
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 254,542
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 105,706
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 76,148
Total unmatched withdrawals (181,854)
Excess balances (7,918)
Net deposits 64,769 64,769        129,538                       
    Matchable balances 29,551            29,550        59,101
    Matched withdrawals 35,218 35,219        70,437
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for Mercy Corps
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Participant Characteristics (N=65) 
 
           Gender %
Female 68
Male 32
Population 2,500 or more 0
Population les s  than 2,500 100
African-American 0
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 0
Caucas ian 100
Hispanic 0
Native American 0
Other 0
13 to 19 22
20s 22
30s 23
40s 20
50s 11
60 to 72 3
Never Married 29
Married 54
Divorced or Separated 15
W idowed 2
Miss ing 0
One Adult with Children 8
One Adult without Children 5
Two or more Adults  with Children 66
Two or more Adults  without Children 22
1 12
2 77
3 9
4 0
5 or more 2
Miss ing 0
0 26
1 31
2 31
3 12
4 0
5 or more 0
Res idence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital S tatus
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 20
No 80
Did not Complete High School 42
Completed High School or GED 32
Attended College 20
Completed 2-year Degree 2
Completed Unspecified Degree 2
Completed 4-year Degree or more 3
Employed Full-time 62
Employed Part-time 22
Unemployed 3
Not W orking 5
Student, not W orking 8
Student, also W orking 2
Yes 18
No 80
0 to 49 18
50 to 74 22
75 to 99 22
100 to 124 15
125 to 149 6
150 to 174 11
175 to 199 3
200 to 686 0
Miss ing 3
Never 75
Formerly 23
Currently 6
Yes 22
No 78
Miss ing 0
Yes 26
No 74
Miss ing 0
Yes 77
No 22
Miss ing 2
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Multiple Participants  in Household
Yes 52
No 46
Miss ing 2
Home Purchase 6
Self-employment 12
Post-secondary Education 29
Home Repair 52
Retirement 0
Job Training 0
Miss ing 0
Yes 2
No 98
Yes 2
No 98
Yes 0
No 100
Yes 28
No 72
Miss ing 0
Yes 46
No 54
Miss ing 0
Yes 0
No 100
Miss ing 0
Passbook Savings  Account 5
Checking 62
Both 3
Either 63
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
Direct Depos it to IDA Account
Bank Account
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Employee of Host Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an 
Income Source 
(%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 65 894 872 0 2,134 0 85 68
Government Benefits 65 195 0 0 1,186 0 46 18
Pensions 65 28 0 0 937 0 5 2
Investments 63 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
    Recurrent Sources 63 1,126 1,117 0 2,298 2 94 88
Self-employment 65 63 0 0 1,200 0 17 6
Child Support 65 14 0 0 600 0 3 1
Gifts 65 30 0 0 1,071 0 6 1
Other Sources 65 35 0 0 525 0 11 4
    Intermittent Sources 65 142 0 0 1,200 0 32 12
Total Income 63 1,251 1,226 0 2,298 2 98 100
Income/Poverty 63 0.86 0.84 0.00 1.79 2
Income for Participants for MACED
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 65 11 0 0 500 0 5 0
Checking Account 63 730 60 0 32,000 2 60 5
    Total Liquid Assets 63 742 60 0 32,000 2 62 5
Home 64 21,828 20,000 0 65,000 1 84 69
Car 65 4,190 2,000 0 18,000 0 88 24
Business 65 460 0 0 26,889 0 3 1
Land or Property 65 185 0 0 8,000 0 3 1
Investments 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Total Illiquid Assets 64 26,738 26,563 0 71,000 1 95 95
Total Assets 62 27,500 26,859 0 82,500 3 98 100
Total Liabilities 65 13,089 10,400 0 53,000 0
        Net Worth 62 14,495 9,150 -34,500 82,500 3
Assets of Participants for MACED
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Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 88
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 31
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $122
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 48
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 2.8
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $347
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $2,435
  Matched Withdrawals for MACED
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 16,825
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 357
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 848
Total unmatched withdrawals (1,205)
Excess balances (242)
Net deposits 15,378 75,328          90,706                         
    Matchable balances 4,635           10,588          15,223
    Matched withdrawals 10,743 64,740          75,483
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for MACED
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability Type 
(%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 65 10,332 3,200 0 50,000 0 51 64
Car Loan 65 1,527 0 0 12,000 0 29 18
Business Loan 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land or Property 
Mortgage 65 37 0 0 2,400 0 2 2
Family and Friends Debt 65 107 0 0 5,000 0 6 3
Household Bills 65 82 0 0 3,000 0 11 0
Medical Bills 65 437 0 0 15,000 0 11 4
Credit-card 65 52 0 0 1,900 0 8 5
Student Loans 65 514 0 0 18,000 0 3 3
    Total Liabilities 65 13,089 10,400 0 53,000 0 71 100
Total Assets 62 27,500 26,859 0 82,500 3 98
    Net Worth 62 14,495 9,150 -34,500 82,500 3
Liabilities of Participants for MACED
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Participant Characteristics (N=190) 
 
           Gender %
Female 77
Male 23
Population 2,500 or more 100
Population les s  than 2,500 0
African-American 64
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 1
Caucas ian 30
Hispanic 2
Native American 2
Other 2
13 to 19 11
20s 33
30s 31
40s 16
50s 7
60 to 72 3
Never Married 58
Married 16
Divorced or Separated 25
W idowed 1
Miss ing 1
One Adult with Children 48
One Adult without Children 19
Two or more Adults  with Children 24
Two or more Adults  without Children 8
1 67
2 26
3 4
4 2
5 or more 1
Miss ing 1
0 27
1 18
2 23
3 17
4 7
5 or more 7
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 10
No 90
Did not Complete High School 23
Completed High School or GED 34
Attended College 33
Completed 2-year Degree 3
Completed Unspecified Degree 0
Completed 4-year Degree or more 7
Employed Full-time 42
Employed Part-time 18
Unemployed 13
Not W orking 9
Student, not W orking 9
Student, also W orking 9
Yes 7
No 93
0 to 49 29
50 to 74 11
75 to 99 17
100 to 124 17
125 to 149 13
150 to 174 6
175 to 199 5
200 to 686 2
Miss ing 0
Never 53
Formerly 44
Currently 6
Yes 18
No 82
Miss ing 1
Yes 16
No 84
Miss ing 0
Yes 49
No 29
Miss ing 22
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Multiple Participants  in Household
Education
Yes 35
No 43
Miss ing 22
Home Purchase 47
Self-employment 19
Post-secondary Education 23
Home Repair 0
Retirement 0
Job Training 11
Miss ing 0
Yes 4
No 96
Yes 6
No 94
Yes 1
No 99
Yes 41
No 52
Miss ing 7
Yes 32
No 61
Miss ing 7
Yes 4
No 96
Miss ing 0
Passbook Savings  Account 65
Checking 45
Both 35
Either 75
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Bank Account
Employee of Host Organization
Previous  Relationship with 
Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Direct Depos it to IDA Account
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Income 
Source (%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 190 895 845 0 3,700 0 74 65
Government Benefits 190 140 0 0 1,498 0 29 18
Pensions 190 4 0 0 412 0 3 1
Investments 190 1 0 0 114 0 1 0
    Recurrent Sources 190 1,039 968 0 3,700 0 91 84
Self-employment 190 50 0 0 2,500 0 6 4
Child Support 190 33 0 0 892 0 11 3
Gifts 190 25 0 0 1,617 0 6 4
Other Sources 190 39 0 0 1,300 0 8 5
    Intermittent Sources 190 147 0 0 2,500 0 31 16
Total Income 190 1,186 1,100 50 4,273 0 100 100
Income/Poverty 190 0.87 0.88 0.00 3.95 0
Income for Participants for Near Eastside
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 190 146 14 0 4,385 0 65 20
Checking Account 190 80 0 0 2,000 0 45 7
    Total Liquid Assets 190 226 55 0 4,385 0 75 27
Home 190 5,805 0 0 135,000 0 9 10
Car 190 2,409 775 0 22,000 0 66 60
Business 190 368 0 0 25,000 0 5 2
Land or Property 190 182 0 0 34,500 0 1 0
Investments 190 316 0 0 32,800 0 8 2
    Total Illiquid Assets 190 9,080 900 0 147,000 0 67 73
Total Assets 190 9,305 1,100 0 147,050 0 83 100
Total Liabilities 188 8,993 1,663 0 130,000 2
        Net Worth 188 138 -58 -50,695 85,150 2
Assets of Participants for Near Eastside
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Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches 
 
 
 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Liability 
Value by 
Type (%)
Home Mortgage 190 3,547 0 0 120,000 0 8 9
Car Loan 190 1,547 0 0 23,000 0 24 19
Business Loan 190 9 0 0 1,800 0 1 0
Land or Property 
Mortgage 190 74 0 0 14,000 0 1 0
Family and Friends Debt 189 367 0 0 45,000 1 17 7
Household Bills 189 141 0 0 1,500 1 33 16
Medical Bills 190 595 0 0 10,000 0 37 18
Credit-card 189 697 0 0 22,954 1 28 10
Student Loans 190 1,929 0 0 50,000 0 23 20
    Total Liabilities 188 8,993 1,663 0 130,000 2 74 100
Total Assets 190 9,305 1,100 0 147,050 0 83
    Net Worth 188 138 -58 -50,695 85,150 2
Liabilities of Participants for Near Eastside
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 199
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 53
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $113
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 28
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 3.8
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $422
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $1,768
  Matched Withdrawals for Near Eastside
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 75,098
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 4,367
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 23,673
Total unmatched withdrawals (28,040)
Excess balances (5,437)
Net deposits 41,620 134,258           175,878                       
    Matchable balances 19,230        62,964             82,194
    Matched withdrawals 22,390 71,294             93,684
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for Near Eastside
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Participant Characteristics (N=203) 
 
            Gender %
Female 77
Male 23
Population 2,500 or more 100
Population les s  than 2,500 0
African-American 91
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 0
Caucas ian 5
Hispanic 1
Native American 0
Other 2
13 to 19 2
20s 33
30s 35
40s 23
50s 6
60 to 72 1
Never Married 60
Married 14
Divorced or Separated 21
W idowed 4
Miss ing 1
One Adult with Children 44
One Adult without Children 17
Two or more Adults  with Children 28
Two or more Adults  without Children 10
1 62
2 26
3 8
4 1
5 or more 2
Miss ing 1
0 27
1 24
2 23
3 13
4 7
5 or more 5
Res idence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital S tatus
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 2
No 98
Did not Complete High School 17
Completed High School or GED 17
Attended College 48
Completed 2-year Degree 0
Completed Unspecified Degree 12
Completed 4-year Degree or more 6
Employed Full-time 58
Employed Part-time 17
Unemployed 8
Not W orking 2
Student, not W orking 9
Student, also W orking 6
Yes 11
No 89
0 to 49 23
50 to 74 10
75 to 99 6
100 to 124 14
125 to 149 11
150 to 174 7
175 to 199 9
200 to 686 19
Miss ing 0
Never 55
Formerly 45
Currently 15
Yes 13
No 81
Miss ing 6
Yes 16
No 81
Miss ing 3
Yes 57
No 30
Miss ing 13
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Multiple Participants  in Household
Yes 49
No 38
Miss ing 13
Home Purchase 50
Self-employment 23
Post-secondary Education 16
Home Repair 6
Retirement 0
Job Training 4
Miss ing 0
Yes 1
No 99
Yes 0
No 100
Yes 6
No 94
Yes 19
No 81
Miss ing 0
Yes 67
No 33
Miss ing 0
Yes 3
No 97
Miss ing 0
Passbook Savings  Account 35
Checking 57
Both 25
Either 67
Bank Account
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Employee of Hos t Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
Life-Insurance Coverage
Intended or Actual Use of 
Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
Direct Deposit to IDA Account
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Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an 
Income Source 
(%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 203 1,150 1,200 0 3,892 0 78 69
Government Benefits 203 161 0 0 1,700 0 32 16
Pensions 203 15 0 0 2,000 0 1 1
Investments 202 2 0 0 400 1 1 0
    Recurrent Sources 202 1,334 1,354 0 3,892 1 93 86
Self-employment 203 102 0 0 2,000 0 11 7
Child Support 203 25 0 0 800 0 7 2
Gifts 203 10 0 0 800 0 3 1
Other Sources 203 47 0 0 1,568 0 7 3
    Intermittent Sources 203 185 0 0 2,360 0 26 14
Total Income 202 1,516 1,543 0 3,892 1 100 100
Income/Poverty 202 1.22 1.18 0.00 3.45 1
Income for Participants for Shorebank
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 202 169 0 0 3,100 1 36 14
Checking Account 196 223 51 0 4,500 7 56 20
    Total Liquid Assets 196 389 138 0 4,500 7 67 34
Home 202 9,022 0 0 160,000 1 10 12
Car 200 3,143 0 0 25,000 3 48 42
Business 201 968 0 0 53,000 2 8 4
Land or Property 200 325 0 0 65,000 3 1 1
Investments 199 557 0 0 30,000 4 15 8
    Total Illiquid Assets 195 13,941 800 0 220,000 8 56 66
Total Assets 192 14,516 1,335 0 220,460 11 75 100
Total Liabilities 190 11,119 1,600 0 110,000 13
        Net Worth 186 2,360 0 -50,694 92,100 17
Assets of Participants for Shorebank
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Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches 
 
 
 
 
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 90
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 41
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $293
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 20
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 2.2
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $644
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $1,556
  Matched Withdrawals for Shorebank
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 163,877
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 60,461
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 38,066
Total unmatched withdrawals (98,527)
Excess balances (14,337)
Net deposits 51,014 69,444          120,458                       
    Matchable balances 24,620          32,027          56,647
    Matched withdrawals 26,394 37,417          63,811
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for Shorebank
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a Liability 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Liability 
Value by Type 
(%)
Home Mortgage 202 6,559 0 0 145,000 1 9 11
Car Loan 194 1,954 0 0 18,000 9 23 21
Business Loan 200 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
Land or Property 
Mortgage 202 297 0 0 60,000 1 0 0
Family and Friends Debt 201 72 0 0 3,000 2 12 6
Household Bills 201 249 0 0 4,600 2 30 20
Medical Bills 202 369 0 0 41,115 1 19 8
Credit-card 200 828 0 0 20,000 3 36 17
Student Loans 202 1,167 0 0 35,000 1 19 16
    Total Liabilities 190 11,119 1,600 0 110,000 13 73 100
Total Assets 192 14,516 1,335 0 220,460 11 75
    Net Worth 186 2,360 0 -50,694 92,100 17
Liabilities of Participants for Shorebank
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Participant Characteristics (N=231) 
 
            Gender %
Female 97
Male 3
Population 2,500 or more 76
Population les s  than 2,500 24
African-American 85
Asian-American or Pacific Is lander 0
Caucas ian 10
Hispanic 2
Native American 1
Other 1
13 to 19 0
20s 20
30s 43
40s 28
50s 7
60 to 72 1
Never Married 63
Married 10
Divorced or Separated 24
W idowed 1
Miss ing 2
One Adult with Children 55
One Adult without Children 11
Two or more Adults  with Children 26
Two or more Adults  without Children 6
1 66
2 24
3 7
4 1
5 or more 0
Miss ing 2
0 17
1 23
2 26
3 15
4 12
5 or more 7
Residence
Race/Ethnicity
Age
Marital Status
Household Type
Adults  in Household
Children in Household
Yes 6
No 94
Did not Complete High School 15
Completed High School or GED 35
Attended College 31
Completed 2-year Degree 1
Completed Unspecified Degree 12
Completed 4-year Degree or more 6
Employed Full-time 57
Employed Part-time 24
Unemployed 6
Not W orking 1
Student, not W orking 5
Student, also W orking 6
Yes 35
No 65
0 to 49 29
50 to 74 13
75 to 99 13
100 to 124 14
125 to 149 10
150 to 174 6
175 to 199 4
200 to 686 9
Miss ing 2
Never 42
Formerly 58
Currently 29
Yes 25
No 75
Miss ing 0
Yes 10
No 90
Miss ing 0
Yes 63
No 37
Miss ing 0
Multiple Participants  in Household
Education
Employment
Self-employed
Income/Poverty (% )
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Received Food Stamps
Received SSI/SSDI
Health-Insurance Coverage
Yes 17
No 83
Miss ing 0
Home Purchase 48
Self-employment 45
Post-secondary Education 7
Home Repair 0
Retirement 0
Job Training 0
Miss ing 0
Yes 0
No 100
Yes 2
No 98
Yes 2
No 98
Yes 62
No 38
Miss ing 0
Yes 38
No 62
Miss ing 0
Yes 1
No 99
Miss ing 0
Passbook Savings  Account 36
Checking 51
Both 29
Either 58
Life-Insurance Coverage
Inteded or Actual Use 
of Matched Withdrawals
Multiple Uses  of Matched Withdrawals
Direct Depos it to IDA Account
Bank Account
Matched Use Differs  from Intended Use
Employee of Host Organization
Previous  Relationship 
with Host Organization
Referred by Partner Organization
   Final Report on Saving Performance in ADD 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
102 
Income, Assets, and Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
Income Source N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an 
Income Source 
(%)
Distribution of 
Total Income by 
Source (%)
Wage-employment 231 755 600 0 3,600 0 68 53
Government Benefits 231 159 0 0 3,098 0 32 16
Pensions 231 11 0 0 1,021 0 2 1
Investments 227 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
    Recurrent Sources 227 937 956 0 3,600 4 81 69
Self-employment 231 269 0 0 5,000 0 28 16
Child Support 231 56 0 0 1,600 0 14 4
Gifts 231 20 0 0 1,600 0 5 2
Other Sources 231 100 0 0 1,468 0 25 9
    Intermittent Sources 231 445 100 0 5,000 0 55 31
Total Income 227 1,378 1,200 0 5,000 4 99 100
Income/Poverty 227 1.00 0.88 0.00 5.33 4
Income for Participants for WSEP
Asset Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with an Asset 
Type (%)
Distribution of 
Total Asset 
Value by Type 
(%)
Passbook Account 228 145 0 0 4,000 3 36 11
Checking Account 222 160 0 0 6,000 9 49 17
    Total Liquid Assets 222 310 18 0 6,000 9 57 28
Home 231 6,597 0 0 115,000 0 10 10
Car 229 2,841 0 0 28,000 2 41 40
Business 231 5,005 0 0 350,000 0 20 18
Land or Property 231 468 0 0 72,000 0 2 0
Investments 231 239 0 0 10,000 0 10 3
    Total Illiquid Assets 229 15,257 500 0 362,000 2 52 72
Total Assets 221 14,854 700 0 362,000 10 69 100
Total Liabilities 223 10,723 1,350 0 194,737 8
        Net Worth 215 2,772 0 -148,492 130,500 16
Assets of Participants for WSEP
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Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches 
 
 
 
 
Liability Type N Mean ($) Median ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Missing
Participants 
with a 
Liability Type 
(%)
Distribution 
of Total 
Liability 
Value by 
Type (%)
Home Mortgage 231 4,131 0 0 98,000 0 9 11
Car Loan 230 1,417 0 0 26,000 1 15 15
Business Loan 231 844 0 0 90,000 0 7 6
Land or Property 
Mortgage 231 416 0 0 76,000 0 1 0
Family and Friends Debt 229 502 0 0 40,000 2 17 9
Household Bills 229 395 0 0 30,000 2 25 13
Medical Bills 229 924 0 0 150,000 2 13 7
Credit-card 230 552 0 0 17,000 1 21 13
Student Loans 231 1,708 0 0 32,000 0 24 26
    Total Liabilities 223 10,723 1,350 0 194,737 8 64 100
Total Assets 221 14,854 700 0 362,000 10 69
    Net Worth 215 2,772 0 -148,492 130,500 16
Liabilities of Participants for WSEP
Item Value
Number of Matched Withdrawals 44
Number of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 40
Average Value of a Matched Withdrawal $433
Percentage of Participants with a Matched Withdrawal 17
Number of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal 1.1
Value of Matched Withdrawals per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $476
Value of Matched Withdrawals plus Match per Participant with a Matched Withdrawal $1,704
  Matched Withdrawals for WSEP
Type of cash flow Amount Match Amount plus Match
Gross deposits 90,983
    Unmatched withdrawals of excess deposits 22,155
    Unmatched withdrawals of matchable deposits 29,602
Total unmatched withdrawals (51,757)
Excess balances (1,935)
Net deposits 37,290 91,627         128,917                       
    Matchable balances 18,240          42,525         60,765
    Matched withdrawals 19,050 49,102         68,152
Deposits, Withdrawals, and Matches (Cumulative) for WSEP
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This appendix discusses the data and methods used to analyze savings in ADD.  The goal is to 
help readers to make informed judgements about how to use the results. 
 
MIS IDA 
 
Program staff collected data for the evaluation with MIS IDA.  MIS IDA also helps programs to 
manage the logistics of IDAs.  CSD anticipated the need for MIS IDA, designed and created the 
software, and now distributes and supports it.  Version 3.0, released in January 2000, was used to 
collect the data in this report.  Table D.1 lists selected fields collected in MIS IDA Version 3.0.  
The latest software, Version 4.0, became available in early 2002. 
 
MIS IDA provides management tools such as account statements, mailings, and more than 30 
reports.  It also generates a comprehensive database on program characteristics, participant 
characteristics, and on enrollments, deposits, and withdrawals.  Moreover, with MIS IDA in 
place, an IDA program can track its own performance, and the database facilitates external 
evaluation.  MIS IDA is used in 42 states and the District of Columbia. 
 
IDA staff record five types of data in MIS IDA: account-structure parameters at the start of the 
program, socio-economic data on participants at enrollment, monthly cash-flow data from 
account statements, monthly inputs and expenses, and intermittent events such as class 
attendance and exit. 
 
Data Quality 
 
CSD also developed a complementary software program—MIS IDA QC—as a quality-control 
tool.  To ensure clean data, CSD and the ADD programs ran MIS IDA QC reports and cross-
checked for data-entry errors, missing values, and accounting inconsistencies.  Programs were 
asked to correct missing or inconsistent data.  This extensive process significantly improved the 
quality of data. 
 
The cash-flow data from MIS IDA are probably the best data that exist on high-frequency saving 
behavior by the poor in any subsidized-savings program.  This report centers on these data. 
 
Data Caveats 
 
The staff members of IDA programs are not full-time researchers, and, despite their consistent 
commitment to accurate data and their strong support for the evaluation as a whole, quality 
varies among programs and among types of data.  Most of the time-constant demographic 
variables are accurate.  We cannot check, however, whether program staff recorded all 
intermittent events such as exit and financial education. 
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Table D.1  Selected Data Collected in MIS IDA Version 3.0 
 
Characteristics of Programs 
• Age of host organization 
• Type of financial institution(s) 
 
Funding Partners of Programs 
• Type of organization 
• Matchable uses 
• Starting and ending dates of partnership 
• Amount and type of contribution 
 
Account Structure for Programs 
• Frequency of account statements 
• Number of signatures required for withdrawals 
• Penalties for unmatched withdrawals 
• Matchable uses 
• Wait period(s) 
 
Inputs and Costs of Programs 
• Types of marketing activities 
• Salary expenses (includes benefits) 
• Non-salary expenses (consultants, rent or mortgage, 
equipment, utilities, supplies, travel, and other) 
• Hours of salaried staff of the IDA program 
• Hours of volunteer staff 
• Hours of staff of partner organizations 
 
Financial Education 
• Hours of general financial education offered and required 
by a program 
• Hours of asset-specific education required by a program 
• Hours of general financial education attended by a 
participant 
• Hours and types of asset-specific education attended by a 
participant 
Enrollment of Participants 
• Social Security number 
• Name and address 
• Name and address of relative 
• Enrollment date 
• Date of exit 
• Reason for exit 
• Previous relationship with host organization 
• Referral from partner organization 
 
Demographics of Participants 
• Gender 
• Year of birth 
• Urban/rural residence 
• Marital status 
• Number of adults in household 
 
 
 
Demographics of Participants continued 
• Number of children in household 
• Race/Ethnicity 
• Education status 
• Employment status 
 
Income and Public Assistance of Participants 
• Monthly gross income (wages, government benefits, 
pensions, investments, self-employment, child support, 
gifts, and other) 
• Former TANF or AFDC status  
• Current TANF status 
• Current food-stamp status 
• Current SSI/SSDI status 
 
Assets, Liabilities, and Insurance of Participants 
• Assets (passbook savings, checking, home, car, business, 
land or property, investments) 
• Liabilities (home, car, business, land or property, family 
or friends, household bills, medical bills, credit cards, 
student loans) 
• Insurance (health, life) 
 
Account Data for Participants 
• Number of bank account 
• Name of financial institution 
• Date account opened and date closed 
• Funding partner(s) 
• Use of direct deposit 
• Type of match-cap structure 
• Annual match cap 
• Lifetime match cap 
• Match rate 
• Time cap 
 
Periodic Deposits and Withdrawals by Participants 
• Starting and ending balance 
• Number and amount of deposits 
• Number and amount of withdrawals 
• Amount of service fees 
• Amount of interest 
 
Matched Withdrawals by Participants 
• Use of withdrawal 
• Vendor name and address 
• Withdrawal date 
• Amount withdrawn 
• Amount of match 
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As in all surveys, data on income, assets, and liabilities are measured with error.  Participants 
often do not know these values, especially for non-financial assets such as homes or cars.  MIS 
IDA asked for income at the household level but for assets at the individual level, and we do not 
know how participants reported jointly owned assets.  Some people may have understated 
income or assets in the belief that this would increase their chances of acceptance into the means-
tested program. 
 
Account-structure parameters in MIS IDA may not always match the rules used in the field or 
the rules communicated to participants.  This might result from staff turnover, because programs 
did not think much about some aspects of account structure (such as the time cap) until after they 
started, and/or because programs changed the structure of accounts but did not record the change 
in MIS IDA. 
 
Statistical Explanations 
 
Mean. The mean is the average.  For categorical variables (for example, gender), each category 
is represented by one variable that will take a value of zero (if the participant is not female) or 
one (if the participant is female).  Thus, the mean is the share of the characteristic that takes a 
given value. 
 
Statistical significance and the p-value. This report discusses the precision of estimates of links 
between savings outcomes and the characteristics of participants and programs in terms of 
statistical significance.  Results are statistically significant if they are not likely due to sampling 
variation.  Larger sample sizes boost statistical significance, the confidence that an estimated 
relationship is “real” and does not merely reflect an unusual sample due to chance.   
 
For example, suppose that we want to test a coin for fairness (a fair coin lands on “heads” half 
the time).  For 100 tosses of a fair coin, we would expect about 50 “heads.”  Even for a fair coin, 
however, we would not be surprised if, because of luck, we got 60 or more “heads.”  But luck 
should even out with more tosses.  If we tossed the coin 1,000 times and had 600 or more 
“heads,” then we might wonder whether the coin is really fair.  If 1,000,000 tosses produce 
600,000 or more “heads,” then we would strongly suspect a rigged coin. 
 
The result of 60 or more “heads” in 100 tosses may not be statistically significant; it could 
happen even with a fair coin.  The result of 600 or more “heads” in 1,000 tosses is more 
statistically significant; it is unlikely with a fair coin.  The result of 600,000 or more “heads” in 
1,000,000 tosses is highly statistically significant; it would almost never happen with a fair coin. 
 
Statistical significance is expressed as a degree of confidence.  For example, suppose that many 
people toss fair coins 100 times and that 75 percent of them get 59 or fewer “heads.”  If we then 
toss a coin of unknown fairness 100 times and get 60 “heads,” we can have 75-percent 
confidence that it is not a fair coin. 
 
The p-value is the complement of the confidence level, expressed as a probability rather than as a 
percentage.  For example, 75-percent confidence implies a p-value of 0.25.  If the confidence 
level is x percent, then the p-value is (100–x)÷100.  Lower p-values indicate higher confidence. 
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Statistical significance depends on both the real relationship and the sample size.  With small 
samples, statistical significance is rare, even if the real relationship is strong.  With large 
samples, statistical significance is common, even if the real relationship is weak.  Policy 
importance of a statistical result depends on both statistical significance and on size of the 
estimated association. 
 
Of course, statistical significance implies only association, not causality.  Furthermore, statistical 
significance does not imply policy significance. Likewise, statistical insignificance does not 
imply policy insignificance.  For example, a statistically insignificant link between the match 
rate and AMND might usefully imply that low matches are just as effective as high ones. 
 
Finally, statistical significance measures imprecision due to sampling variation; it ignores all 
other sources of imprecision (such as measurement error).  For example, a model may assume 
that AMND depends only on gender, even though it really depends on a host of other factors but 
not on gender.  If gender is correlated with the other factors, however, then the model might find 
a large, statistically significant (but incorrect) link between AMND and gender. 
 
Change in percentage points.  The table columns in Chapter 4 labeled “∆ in % pt” (change in 
percentage points) or labeled “∆ in $” (change in dollars) show the change given a unit change in 
an independent variable (one percentage point is 1/100, or 0.01).  If the estimated change linked 
to a unit increase in an independent variable is positive, then the likelihood of being a saver or 
the level of AMND increases.  Negative estimates imply decreases in the likelihood (or level) of 
saving.  For example, the column “∆ in $” in Table 4.4 shows the change in the likelihood of 
saving for participants with a high school education or beyond relative to the likelihood of saving 
for participants without a high school education.  As shown, having graduated from a two-year 
college was associated with an $6.00 decrease—compared to not having a high school 
education—in the likelihood of saving (90-percent confidence). 
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